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PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING AND THE REVIVAL OF
"UNCONSTITUTIONAL" STATUTES
William Michael Treanor*
and Gene B. Sperling**
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 1 reshaped the law of abortion in this country. The Court overturned two
of its previous decisions invalidating state restrictions on abortions,
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 2 and Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 3 and it abandoned the trimester
analytic framework established in Roe v. Wade. 4 At the time Casey was
handed down, twenty states had restrictive abortion statutes on the
books that were in conflict with Akron or Thornburgh and which were
unenforced. 5 In six of these states, courts had held the statutes uncon• Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University; B.A., Yale College, 1979; A.M.,
Harvard University, 1982; J.D., Yale Law School, 1985.
• • Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy; B.A., University of
Minnesota, 1981; J.D., Yale Law School, 1985.
The authors began this article as a result of their discussions about Weeks v.
Connick, 733 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. La. 1990), discussed infra at text accompanying notes
9-14. In that case, Mr. Sperling was co-counsel on the amicus brief filed by the National
Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL). The authors would like to thank the
following people for their comments and suggestions: Akhil Amar, Vikram Amar, Marc
Arkin, Evan Caminker, Claudia Center, George Cochran, Jill Fisch, Martin Flaherty,
James Fleming, Michael Gerhardt, Charles Goetz, Tracy Higgins, Dawn Johnsen, Robert
Kaczorowski, James Kainen, Gerard Lynch, Michael Martin, Russell Pearce, James
Robertson, Howard Shapiro, Steven Shiffrin, Reva Siegel, Steven Thel, Georgene Vairo,
and Marcy Wilder. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a Fordham faculty
colloquium, and the authors would also like to thank the participants in that colloquium
for their valuable insights. Fordham Law School provided generous financial assistance
to Mr. Treanor. Jennifer Ross, Alexis Schatten, and Wendy Stynes supplied superb
research support. Finally, Mr. Sperling wishes to thank Mr. Treanor for completing the
drafting of the article and for revising the article (including adding the argument that
the remedy for the revival problem is extension of prospective overruling to the
statutory context) after Mr. Sperling joined the Clinton campaign and administration.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
2. 4 76 U.S. 74 7 (1986). For that part of Casey overturning Thornburgh's finding of a
constitutional violation when a government regulation requires the provision of
information that is truthful but aimed at convincing women not to have abortions, see
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823 (plurality opinion).
3. 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (Akron 1). The Supreme Court in Akron I held
unconstitutional a mandatory 24-hour waiting period and a requirement that women
considering abortion be provided with information that, while truthful, was designed to
dissuade them from having an abortion. Casey overturned these holdings. See Cast')',
112 S. Ct. at 2822-26 (plurality opinion).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For the relevant part of Casey, see 112 S. Ct. at 2818
(plurality opinion) (rejecting Roe's trimester framework).
5. The following is a list of the relevant statutory or regulatory provisions that
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stitutional. 6 Almost as soon as the Casey ruling was announced, the
campaign to secure enforcement of these restrictions began. 7
Are these statutes good law, despite the fact that they were once in
conflict with governing Supreme Court precedent (and in some cases
had been judicially determined to violate women's constitutional
rights)? Alternatively, will they have to be re-enacted by the legislature
to be enforceable? These questions highlight the revival issue. The
revival issue arises when a court overrules a prior decision in which it
had held a statute unconstitutional. (We will throughout this article
refer to the first decision as the "invalidating decision," and to the second decision as the "overruling decision.") Should the enforceability
of a statute passed prior to the overruling decision be determined by
reference to the invalidating decision-in which case the statute would
have to be repassed to be in effect-or by reference to the overruling
decision-in which case the statute would not have to be repassed? In
other words, does the overruling decision automatically revive a previously unenforceable statute?
established waiting periods and/or counseling requirements that were inconsistent with
the Court's holding in Akron I and Thornburgh: Ala. Admin. Code r. 420-5-.03 (Supp.
1990); Del. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 1794 (1987); Idaho Code§ 18-609 (1987); Ind. Admin.
Code tit. 410, r. 3.5-1 to 3.5-4 (1992); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 311.726, .729 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1990); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.6 (West 1992); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 22, § 1599 (West 1992); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1990 &
Supp. 1992); Miss. Code Ann.§§ 41-41-33,-35 (Supp. 1990); Mo. Ann. Stat.§ 188.039
(Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1992); Mont. Code Ann.§ 50-20-104(3), -106 (1991); Neb. Rev.
Stat.§§ 28-326(8), -327 (1989); N.D. Cent. Code§ 14.02.1-03 (1991); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann.§ 2317.56 (Baldwin Supp. 1992); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 3205 (Supp. 1991);
R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 23-4.7-2 to -5 (1989); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 34-23A (Michie
1987 & Supp. 1993); Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-15-202 (1991 & Supp. 1992); Utah Code
Ann.§§ 76-7-305, -305.5 (1990 & Supp. 1993); Wis. Stat. Ann.§ 46.245 (West 1987),
§ 146.78(1), (2) (West 1989 & Supp. 1990); Wis. Admin. Code§ [Med] 11.04 (May
1989). On the absence of enforcement of these statutes, see National Abortion Rights
Action League, Who Decides? A State-by-State Review of Abortion Rights (4th ed.
1993) [hereinafter 1993 NARAL] (analyzing status of state abortion regulations).
6. See Eubanks v. Brown, 604 F. Supp. 141 (W.O. Ky. 1984) (Kentucky statute);
Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984) (Louisiana statute), aff'd, 794
F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986); Women's Community Health Ctr. v. Tierney, Civ. No. 79-162p (D. Me. Sept. 9, 1983) (Maine statute); Planned Parenthood v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006
(1st Cir. 1981) (Massachusetts statute); Barnes v. Moore, No. J86-9458(W) (S.D. Miss.
Aug. 30, 1991) (Mississippi statute), rev'd, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 656 (1992) (reversal based on Casey); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, No.
92CVH01-528 (Ohio Ct. C. P., Franklin County, May 27, 1992), rev'd, 1993 WL 303631
(Ohio Ct. App.,July 27, 1993) (Ohio statute) (reversing lower court's grant of injunctive
relief barring operation of the Ohio statute and holding the statute constitutional in
light of Casey).
7. See Letter from Eric I. Miller, Esq., Miller and Waters, Attorneys and Counselors
at Law, to John C. Bailey, M.D., State Health Commissioner, Indiana State Board of
Health (June 29, 1992) (seeking enforcement oflndiana informed consent law in light of
Casey) (on file with authors); see also Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 13-14 (5th Cir.
1992) (reversing lower court injunction against enforcement of Mississippi statute in
light of Casey).
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The way in which the revival issue is resolved will thus determine
whether, in light of Casey, previously unenforced statutes became enforceable without the need for any post-Casey legislative action. In addition to affecting what kind of abortion regulations are in effect in
twenty states in the immediate wake of Casey, this determination has
profound consequences for the kind of abortion regulations that will be
in effect in these states in the future. Such long-term consequences
reflect the fact that our governmental system is not one of pure majoritarianism and that the burden of inertia in our legislative process is
heavy: as we will discuss, statutes on the books can stay on the books
even if a current majority no longer desires them; in contrast, proposed
statutes need supermajoritarian support to secure passage. 8 Therefore, the starting point for future legislative action-such as whether
pre-Casey abortion regulations are enforceable-influences the legislative action that in fact develops.
The revival issue arose in perhaps its starkest form in the case of
Weeks v. Connick. 9 In 1989, elected officials in Louisiana responded to
the Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 10
by claiming that Roe had been effectively overruled and by seeking enforcement of a draconian 134-year-old law criminalizing abortion 1 1
which had previously been found unconstitutional under Roe . 12 The
court in Weeks avoided confronting the revival issue by holding that the
statute in question had been implicitly repealed. 13 As the Court's decision in Casey made clear, Webster did not overrule Roe, and the Court is
unlikely to allow the enforcement of criminal abortion laws in the near
future. But Louisiana's attempt to enforce its 1855 statute focused significant attention for the first time on the future status of the dozens of
then-unconstitutional state abortion restrictions, as well as on the revival issue more generally. 14
8. For further discussion, see infra Part III.A.
9. 733 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. La. 1990).
10. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
11. The statute prohibited all abortions and provided that doctors who performed
abortions would receive a minimum sentence of one year at hard labor and a maximum
sentence of ten years at hard labor. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:87, :87.4, :88 (West
1986).
12. See Weeks, 733 F. Supp. at 1037.
13. After the criminal abortion statute was enjoined in 1976, the Louisiana
legislature passed a series of statutes regulating abortion. The court held that, by thus
opting for the path of regulation rather than criminalization in these statutes, the
Louisiana legislature implicitly repealed the earlier statute. See id. at 1037-38. After
Weeks, the state legislature amended and narrowed this criminal abortion statute. See
La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 14:87 (West 1993). See also Sojourner v. Roemer, 772 F. Supp.
930 (E.D. La. 1991) (holding statute unconstitutional and granting injunction against
enforcement), aff'd, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1414 (1993).
The amended statute is discussed at note 113, infra.
14. For examples of press coverage of this story, see Louisiana: Back to the "Dark
Ages"?, Newsweek, Oct. 9, 1989, at 34; Frances Marcus, Louisiana Lawyers Move to
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While the Court's recent abortion decisions dramatically illustrate
the consequences that may follow when a court, after having held a
statute unconstitutional, overrules that decision, the revival issue is certainly not limited to the abortion context. Indeed, it is one that will
likely arise with growing frequency in the coming years, for the
Supreme Court has been closely divided recently on a wide range of
constitutional matters. In his 1991 dissent in Payne v. Tennessee, 15 Justice Marshall listed seventeen important constitutional cases decided
since 1985 by a vote of five to four. 16 Given the Supreme Court's current state of ideological flux, Justice Ginsburg's recent appointment,
and the likelihood of additional Supreme Court vacancies in the next
few years, there may well be reversals of determinations of unconstitutionality involving affirmative action, 17 the Establishment Clause, 18 free
speech, 19 and governmental takings of private property.2° Increasing
the likelihood of such reversals is the overall tendency by the Court in
recent years to accord diminished weight to the principle of stare
decisis. 21
In this Article, we argue that in some-but notall-circumstances,
Revive Invalidated Laws Banning Abortions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1989, at A9; Ruth
Marcus, State Pleads to Reimpose Criminal Abortion Law, Wash. Post, Oct. 7, 1989, at
A7.
15. IllS. Ct. 2597,2619-25 (1991) (Marshall,]., dissenting).
16. See id. at 2623 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
17. See Wygandt v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-84 (1986) (layoff
provision that favored minority teachers found to violate Equal Protection Clause) (five
vote majority opinion).
18. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 408-14 (1985) (Establishment Clause
found to bar governmental financial assistance to parochial schools) (five vote majority).
19. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 74-76 (1990) (First Amendment
right not to be denied public employment or pay increase within public employment
because of party affiliation) (five vote majority); Peel v. Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1990) (attorney found to have First
Amendment right to advertise legal specialization) (five vote majority); Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-92 (1987) (First Amendment right of public employee to
express views on matters of public importance) (five vote majority).
20. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2888 (1992)
(governmental regulation that deprives property of all value is a taking unless regulation
reflects restrictions present in the background principles of the state's law of property
and nuisance) (five vote majority).
21. See generally Michael Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 68 (1991). For example, according
to Professor Gerhardt's study, of the 105 cases in which the Court has overturned prior
decisions, 64 were handed down from 1960 to the present. See id. at 147-59 (listing
cases). There are, of course, exceptions to this general trend, and Casey reflects a
greater respect for precedent than had been commonly anticipated. See generally
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 27-40 (1992) (discussing Casey and Lee v.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), as instances of "surprising moderation" which
reflected presumption that precedent should be followed in the absence of compelling
reasons to the contrary).
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statutes that were unconstitutional under the rule enunciated in the invalidating decision should not be revived when the invalidating decision is overturned. We base this conclusion upon two separate and
independent theoretical bases.
First, full examination of the revival issue demonstrates the interactive nature of the relationship between judicial invalidation of statutes and majoritarian decision-making. Judicial review is not purely
external to the legislative process: the very act of judicial invalidation
powerfully shapes subsequent legislative deliberations. Belief in the finality of judicial judgments is so pervasive that, when a statute is struck
down or when a judicial decision establishes a rule oflaw under which a
statute is unconstitutional, its opponents frequently act as if the statute
were gone for all time. At the very least, even if political actors realize
the potential for reversal, the finding of unconstitutionality alters the
way in which they spend their political capital. As a result, rather than
seek to repeal a statute that appears to be, for all practical purposes, a
nullity, they devote their political resources to other-more clearly consequential-matters. Revival in such circumstances can produce aresult contrary to what the political process would have produced in the
absence of the initial judicial decision.
We will call the response of political actors to judicial decisions
political reliance. Proper concern for the majoritarian process leads to
the conclusion that in some situations political reliance merits protection through nonrevival.
Second, the revival issue dramatically raises the question: when
should statutes adopted by past majorities establish the starting point
for current majoritarian lawmaking? The revival issue thus forces reconsideration of a question that has troubled Americans since the times
of the debates over the ratification of the Constitution: why should we
defer to what past majorities decided rather than consider issues anew?
In this Article, we argue that, given the essentially libertarian bias of
our constitutional system of governance, a statute that has once been
unconstitutional under governing case law should not be revived if it
constrains individual liberty (as do, for example, the abortion regulations sanctioned by Casey).
The way to protect political reliance and to force legislative reconsideration of constitutionally problematic statutes is through an extension of the doctrine of prospective overruling. When a court
prospectively overrules an earlier decision, it decides that the new rule
of law-the law announced in the overruling decision-will be applied
only in cases that arise in the future; other cases will continue to be
decided under the rule of law enunciated in the decision that is being
overruled. The doctrine of prospective overruling currently applies
only to conduct engaged in prior to the overruling decision. Recognition of the existence and the importance of political reliance and of the
importance of legislative reconsideration of constitutionally problem-
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a tic statutes warrants an expansion of this technique. In this Article, we
will argue that in a limited class of cases the doctrine of prospective
overruling should be available to courts as they consider the enforceability of statutes enacted prior to the overruling decision. Thus, in certain instances, the overruling decision would not lead to revival; rather,
a court would apply the rule of law of the initial decision to statutes
passed prior to the overruling decision and therefore bar enforcement
of the statutes (unless they were repassed after the overruling decision).
This argument for the extension of prospective overruling is novel,
and the argument that the overruling decision need not always mean
automatic revival runs counter to the weight of judicial and scholarly
opinion on point. The Supreme Court has-without analysis of the issue-revived previously unenforceable statutes. A limited number of
state courts and commentators have explicitly addressed the issue and
have concluded almost uniformly that a statute barred under the invalidating decision becomes enforceable when that decision is overturned.
There is, however, no controlling federal case law in which the revival
issue is addressed, and so, with respect to federal law and the law of
most states, the revival issue remains open. In Part I, as a prelude to
our argument, we set out this relevant case law and scholarly work.
Part II elaborates on the first of the two previously discussed theoretical bases for the argument against revival. Here, we develop the
political reliance argument for prospective overruling in the statutory
context and outline when political reliance makes prospective overruling appropriate. This part discusses what political reliance is and offers
specific historical examples in which political actors have shaped their
decisions in reliance on judicial decisions. It then compares political
reliance to other types of reliance interests that the law safeguards
through the use of stare decisis, qualified immunity for government officials in tort suits, and prospective overruling.
We argue that, just as Benjamin Cardozo created the doctrine of
prospective overruling to protect individuals who structured transactions in reliance on judicial decisions, so it is now appropriate to extend
the doctrine of prospective overruling to the statutory context to protect political decision-making. We see prospective overruling in the
statutory context as an exercise of the judicial power to construct a
remedy to protect those who have relied on earlier judicial pronouncements. Use of this technique would be discretionary and situationspecific, and we discuss in what types of cases it would be appropriate
to use prospective overruling to protect political reliance. Specifically,
we contend that in determining whether there has been political reliance and whether such reliance merits protection, courts should consider the amount of time that elapsed between the invalidating decision
and the overruling decision, whether the statute at issue was clearly unconstitutional under the invalidating decision, and whether the statute
was passed before or after the invalidating decision.
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Part III develops the second of our two arguments against revival,
focusing on the question of when current majorities should be forced
to revisit previously passed statutes. In addition to advancing a theoretical basis for prospective overruling of statutes separate from that
developed in Part II, this part defines a separate category of cases in
which use of the technique is appropriate. We draw here on Alexander
Bickel's argument in his essay "The Passive Virtues" 22 that courts
should use a variety of technical devices to force current legislative reconsideration of constitutionally troublesome statutes. Consideration
of Bickel's essay and its implications suggests that use of the doctrine of
prospective overruling is particularly appropriate when the statute in
question implicates individual liberty interests. The technique of prospective overruling should be used to ensure that, when an invalidating
decision is concerned with the protection of individual liberty, a statute
that was unconstitutional under the rule oflaw set forth in that decision
is not revived by the overruling decision. Such a statute should be enforceable only if it is desired by a current majority, and the measure of
whether it is desired by a current majority is whether it is repassed following the overruling decision.
I.

CASES AND WRITINGS ON REVIVAL

While the great majority of relevant judicial opinions and scholarly
writings favors revival, it is striking how little consideration the issue
has received and how little case law has explicitly addressed the topic.
Typically, it has simply been assumed, without recognition of the attendant problems, that if a statute is constitutional under the rule established in the overruling decision it should be enforceable without
the need for repassage. When the revival issue has been analyzed, the
analysis has generally been both cursory and highly formalistic. This
part surveys the case law and previous writings bearing on revival, beginning with Supreme Court decisions and then turning to state court
opinions and the scholarly literature.
A.

Supreme Court Case Law

The Supreme Court has not authoritatively addressed the issue of
whether the enforceability of a statute passed prior to the announcement of the overruling decision should be judged by the rule of law
enunciated in the invalidating decision or by the rule of law enunciated
in the overruling decision. Nonetheless, in several cases it has simply
applied the rule of law of the overruling decision to such statutes,
adopting an approach in accordance with the general principle that a
new rule of constitutional law applies retroactively. 23 Thus, it is true
22. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961).
23. It should be added at the outset that there are exceptions to this general
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both that revival has been the Supreme Court's practice and that the
Court has not resolved the revival issue.
The principle that new rules oflaw normally apply retroactively has
considerable antiquity. The relevant Supreme Court precedent can be
traced back to the 1801 decision in United States v. Schooner Peggy. 24
Schooner Peggy involved a condemnation proceeding for a French ship
seized pursuant to presidential authorization. While the case was
before the Court, a treaty with France was ratified which provided that
property that had been seized but not definitively condemned had to be
returned to its owners. The Court therefore faced the question
whether the treaty governed the case, even though ratification followed
issuance of decisions by the district court and circuit court. Chief Justice Marshall held the treaty applicable, stating if "a law ... positively
changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed." 25 While
Schooner Peggy concerned the retroactive effect of a treaty, the doctrine
that a change in law applies retroactively was later extended beyond
this context. Thus, the Supreme Court in 1969 observed that a new
rule of law applies retroactively, regardless of whether the basis of the
change in law is "constitutional, statutory,judicial [,or even] where the
change is made by an administrative agency acting pursuant to legislative authorization. "26
This principle of retroactive application of new law has been applied by the Court when it evaluates the constitutionality and enforceability of statutes passed prior to the announcement of a new rule of
constitutional law. Indeed, the Court seems not to have even considered that in this context special circumstances might warrant the prospective application of a new rule of law. Casey illustrates this point. At
the time of its passage, the Pennsylvania statute at issue in the case was,
according to the holdings in Akron and Thornburgh, unconstitutional. 27
Yet, having decided to overrule these precedents, the Court simply apprinciple. In particular, as will be discussed in Part II, infra, prospective overruling is an
exception to that principle.
24. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103 (1801).
25. Id. at 110.
26. Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 282 (1969). In Thorpe, the Court ruled
that the Schooner Pegg;· doctrine applied to intervening agency decisions. Five years later,
however, the Court retreated from applying the Schooner Pegg;· doctrine in this context.
See NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, Local 347,417 U.S. I, 10 & n.lO (1974)
(remanding for agency determination the decision as to whether a new policy should
apply retroactively). On the ambit of the Schooner Pegg;· doctrine, see John B. Corr,
Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "as Applied," 61 N.C. L. Rev. 745,
756-57 ( 1983) (discussing the Schooner Pegg;· doctrine and its relationship to conflicting
criminal law doctrines); Walter V. Schaefer, Prospective Rulings: Two Perspectives,
1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. I, 19-21.
27. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2822-26 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (overruling the decisions in Akron I and Thornburgh that found informed
consent requirements to be unconstitutional and also overruling .~kron f's ban on
waiting periods).
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plied its new rule of law to the challenged statute. The Court did not
consider whether it would have been more appropriate to judge the
statute's constitutionality or its enforceability under the case law that
governed at the time of its passage or that had governed during its
existence prior to the Court's decision in Casey. 2 8
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish 29 also illustrates the point. In Adkins v.
Children's Hospital 30-the decision overturned in West Coast Hotelthe Court had found that the District of Columbia statute establishing a
minimum wage for children and women violated liberty of contract. In
West Coast Hotel, the Court considered a substantially similar
Washington State statute establishing a minimum wage for women.
The Court overruled Adkins and, without analysis, simply applied its
new rule of law to uphold the Washington State statute. 31
Neither Casey nor West Coast Hotel concerned the same statute that
had been the subject of the invalidating decision. The Legal Tender
Cases, 32 however, represent the application of a statute in a context in
which the Court had previously held that the statute could not constitutionally be applied. In Hepburn v. Griswold, 33 the Supreme Court in
1870 held that the Legal Tender Act of 1862 34-which provided that
federally issued notes could be used to pay off any debt-could not
constitutionally be applied to obligations entered into before its passage.35 Less than two years later, with the appointment of two new
28. See id. It should be added that, on remand, the district court has ruled that the
Supreme Court's decision in Casey did not ultimately resolve the question of the
constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute. According to the district court, the
Supreme Court found only that certain portions of the statute were constitutional on the
record before it, and the district court directed that the record be supplemented in
order to determine whether, on a fuller record, the statute would still satisfy the undue
burden test of the Casey plurality. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 822 F. Supp. 227,
233 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
29. 300 u.s. 379 (1937).
30. 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. 379.
31. See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 400. It should be added that the Washington
State statute, originally passed in 1913, had been continuously enforced since its
enactment, despite the Court's ruling in 1923 in Adkins and despite the fact that there
was no material difference between the District of Columbia statute overturned in Adkins
and the Washington state statute. See id. at 388-91. Thus, lrest Coast Hotel is not a case
in which the Court permitted enforcement of an unenforced statute. It is, however, a
case in which a statute's constitutionality was determined by the rule of law enunciated
in the overturning case, rather than the rule of law in the overturned case.
32. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
33. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1868).
34. 12 Stat. 345, 532.
35. The case was decided by a vote of five to three, and the five vote majority was
split as to its rationale. Four Justices held that the statute covered preexisting
obligations and that in so doing it violated the Legal Tender Clause. Justice Grier, the
fifth vote for the majority, took the position that the statute did not cover preexisting
debts, but that if it did, it was unconstitutional. See Hepbum, 75 U.S. at 626. (Justice
Grier did not file a separate opinion. He voted on the case in conference, but resigned
from the Court between the time when the decision was scheduled to be read and when
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Justices to the Court, the Court reversed itself, specifically overruled
Hepburn, and found the Act constitutional as to both preexisting and
subsequent obligations.3 6 Injustifying the reversal, the majority in the
Legal Tender Cases noted that there was a vacancy on the Court at the
time that Hepburn was decided and that constitutional issues should not
be resolved "in the absence of a full Court, if it can be avoided. " 37 The
Court also stated that, while overruling "should not be done inconsiderately, ... in a case of such far-reaching consequences as the present,
thoroughly convinced as we are that Congress has not transgressed its
powers, we regard [overruling] as our duty." 38 In contrast to this concern with overruling precedent, there was no analysis at all of whether
the statute should have to be repassed by Congress in order to be enforceable. The Court treated it as clear that repassage was not
necessary. 39
Supreme Court case law thus weighs in favor of revival; in a variety
of circumstances, the Court has found that statutes that were inconsistent with a previous decision automatically became enforceable when
that decision was reversed. This does not, however, imply active consideration of the revival issue. Indeed, in In re Rahrer, 40 when one of
the parties advanced the claim that a statute functionally identical to
one held unconstitutional by the Court could be enforceable only if it
were repassed after the Court had reversed its initial determination of
unconstitutionality, the Court made clear that it was not resolving that
it was ultimately read. His position was summarized in the opinion of the Court. See
id.) The three dissenters look the position that the statute applied to preexisting debts,
and that it could constitutionally do so. See id. al 637-38 (Miller, J., dissenting).
36. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. at 553.
37. Id. at 554.
38. Id.
39. With respect lo the Legal Tender Cases, we are nol arguing that, under our
approach, Congress would have had lo re-enact the Legal Tender Act after the overruling decision in order for it lo apply lo preexisting debts. In Part II we contend that
there are a variety of factors that courts should employ in deciding whether there has
been political reliance and hence whether requiring re-enactment would be appropriate.
One factor is the extent to which it was clear that the invalidating decision applied to the
statute al issue in the subsequent case. See infra Part II.D. Thus, when the invalidating
decision actually concerned the statute lateral issue, as in Hepburn, political reliance is to
be expected in the ordinary course of events. However, since the Hepburn decision
provoked immediate controversy and was judicially reconsidered and rejected within a
brief period of time, the argument that the Legal Tender Act was nol repealed because
of political reliance is weak. See discussion infra notes 143-145 and accompanying lexl.
For further discussion of the history of the Legal Tender Cases, see 6 Charles Fairman,
History of the Supreme Court of the United Stales, Reconstruction and Reunion 186488, Part I, at677-775 (1971); Kenneth W. Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 367; Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme Court
and the Legal Tender Cases (installment 1), 54 Harv. L. Rev. 977 (1941) [hereinafter
Fairman, Legal Tender Cases].
40. 140 u.s. 545 (1891).
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issue. 41 In those cases in which an unenforceable statute became enforceable, revival seems to have occurred because the Court assumed
that it was a logical consequence of reversal, rather than because the
Court considered the arguments against revival and rejected them.
B.

State Courts

Unlike the Supreme Court, several state courts have explicitly addressed the revival issue. The relevant state court cases have concerned the specific issue of whether a statute that has been held
unconstitutional is revived when the invalidating decision is overturned.42 With one exception, they have concluded that such statutes
are immediately enforceable.
The most noted instance in which the revival issue was resolved by
a court involved the District of Columbia minimum wage statute pronounced unconstitutional in Adkins. After the Court reversed Adkins in
West Coast Hotel, President Roosevelt asked Attorney General Homer
41. See id. at550-52 (argument of appellee); id. at 559-65 (opinion of the Court).
Rahrer was prosecuted under a Kansas statute that barred selling any liquor in the state.
In Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), the Court had held that a similar Iowa statute
violated the Commerce Clause because it extended to liquor in interstate commerce.
The rationale in Leisy was that states could regulate the sale of liquor in interstate
commerce only with congressional approval, and that Congress had not approved such
regulation. See Leisy, 135 U.S. at 119-25. After Leisy, Congress passed the Wilson Act,
ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1988)), which permiued states
to ban the sale of all liquor. Rahrer's auorneys argued that the decision in Leisy had
rendered the Kansas Act a nullity, and that it would have been enforceable only if the
state had repassed it after Congress had enacted the Wilson Act. See Rahrer, 140 U.S. at
550-52. The Court, however, found this argument inaccurately described Leisy. It stated
that the Kansas law and similar statutes were never "absolutely void, in whole or in part
... as if they had never been enacted. On the contrary, [Leisy] did not annul the law, but
limited its operation to property strictly within the jurisdiction of the State." Id. at 563.
In support of his argument that precedent supported revival, Professor Nimmer invoked
the result in Rahrer. He minimized the significance and logical force of the language just
quoted, writing, "Notwithstanding this disclaimer, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that under Leisy, prior to the Wilson Act the Kansas statute was regarded as void 'in
part,' i.e., in its application to interstate commerce in liquor." Melville B. Nimmer, A
Proposal for Judicial Validation of a Previously Unconstitutional Law: The Civil Rights
Act of 1875, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1394, 1418 n.l02 (1965). Nimmer's auack on the
coherency of the Court's reasoning in Rahrer is telling. But the more important point
for our argument is that the Court avoided confronting the revival issue directly. The
result in Rahrer was that a statute that was once judicially barred from enforcement
became enforceable. Nonetheless, the "disclaimer" had the effect of allowing the Court
to avoid explicitly adopting the revival principle.
42. This issue is a subset of the revival issue. The revival issue is concerned, not
simply with statutes that have been held to be unconstitutional, but with statutes that
were never actually declared unconstitutional but that were at odds with the rule of law
in the invalidating decision. As Casey and Jl'est Coast Hotel suggest, revival in the latter
category of cases has been automatic. It is only with statutes specifically invalidated that
revival has been seen as at all problematic and, as this part of the text indicates, even in
this context courts have almost uniformly found that revival occurs.
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Cummings for an opinion on the status of the District of Columbia's
statute. The Attorney General responded,
The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the
courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that
notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the statute books; and that if a statute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring
it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid
from the date it became effective. 43
Enforcement of the statute followed without congressional action. 44
When this enforcement was challenged, the Municipal Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia injawish v. Morlet 45 held that the
decision in West Coast Hotel had had the effect of making the statute
enforceable. The court observed that previous opinions addressing the
revival issue
proceed on the principle that a statute declared unconstitutional is void in the sense that it is inoperative or unenforceable, but not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished;
that so long as the decision stands the statute is dormant but not dead;
and that if the decision is reversed the statute is valid from its
first effective date. 46
The court declared this precedent sound since the cases were "in accord with the principle 'that a decision of a court of appellate jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and
the effect is not that the former decision is bad law but that it never was
the law.' " 47 Adkins was thus, and had always been, a nullity. The court
acknowledged that, after Adkins, it had been thought that the District of
Columbia's minimum wage statute was unconstitutional. As the court
put it, " '[J]ust about everybody was fooled.' " 48 Nonetheless, the
court's view was that since the minimum wage law had always been
valid, although for a period judicially unenforceable, there was no need
to reenact it. 49
Almost all other courts that have addressed the issue of whether a
statute that has been found unconstitutional can be revived have
reached the same result as the jawish court, using a similar formalistic
43. 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 22, 22-23 (1937).
44. Seejawish v. Morlet, 86 A.2d 96,97 (D.C. 1952) (effect of overruling a case is
that the former decision was never valid). Congress did amend the minimum wage act
prior to Jawish. See id. An argument could be made that in amending the statute after
West Coast Hotel Congress was in effect repassing the statute, thus rendering the revival
issue moot. The Municipal Court of Appeals did not, however, consider such an
argument.
45. 86 A.2d 96, 97 (D.C. 1952).
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Id. (quoting Ruppert v. Ruppert, 134 F.2d 497, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1942)).
48. Id. (quoting Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
314 u.s. 678 (1941)).
49. See id.
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analysis. 50 The sole decision in which a court adopted the nonrevival
position is Jefferson v. Jefferson, 51 a poorly reasoned decision of the
Louisiana Supreme Court. The plaintiff in Jefferson sought child support and maintenance from her husband. She prevailed at the trial
level; he filed his notice of appeal one day after the end of the filing
period established by the Louisiana Uniform Rules of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rejected his appeal as untimely, even
though the Louisiana Supreme Court had previously found that the applicable section of the Uniform Rules violated the state constitution.
One of Ms. Jefferson's arguments before the state Supreme Court was
that that court's previous ruling had been erroneous and that the rules
should therefore be revived. In rejecting this claim and in finding for
the husband, the Court stated:
Since we have declared the uniform court rule partially
unconstitutional, it appears to be somewhat dubious that we
have the right to reconsider this ruling in the instant case as
counsel for the respondent judges urges us to do. For a rule
of court, like a statute, has the force and effect of law and,
when a law is stricken as void, it no longer has existence as
law; the law cannot be resurrected thereafter by a judicial decree changing the finaljudgment of unconstitutionality to constitutionality as this would constitute a reenactment of the law
by the Court-an assumption of legislative power not delegated to it by the Constitution. 52
The Louisiana Court thus took a mechanical approach to the revival
question. According to its rationale, when a statute is found unconstitutional, it is judicially determined never to have existed. Revival therefore entails judicial legislation and thereby violates constitutionally
mandated separation of powers: because the initial legislative passage
50. As the Indiana Supreme Court stated in Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86, 95 (1874):
"ll was not the overruling of those cases which gave validity to the statutes; but the cases
having been overruled, the statutes must be regarded as having been all the time the law
of the State." Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court, in deciding that the overruling
decision revived the unconstitutional statute, used the same metaphor as the jawish
Court: "[T]hough a statute declared unconstitutional becomes inoperative, it is not
dead, only dormant." State ex rei. Badgett v. Lee, 22 So. 2d 804, 806 (Fla. 1945). For
other state court decisions embracing the revival principle, see Christopher v. Mungen,
55 So. 273, 280 (Fla. 1911) (statute inoperative while invalidating decision stands but
enforceable upon reversal of that decision); State v. O'Neil, 126 N.W. 454, 454 (Iowa
1910) (dicta stating that a statute previously held unconstitutional is valid and
enforceable without reenactment when the supposed constitutional amendment has
been removed); McCollum v. McConaughy, 119 N.W. 539, 541 (Iowa 1909); State v.
Douglas, 278 So. 2d 485, 491 & n.6 (La. 1973) (dicta overruling an invalidating decision
and applying challenged statute); State ex. rei. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So. 2d 624, 638
(Miss. 1991) (dicta refusing to overrule an invalidating decision in part out of concern
for the effects of the statute if revived).
51. 153 So. 2d 368 (La. 1963), aff'd, 163 So. 2d 74 (La. 1964).
52. ld. at 370 (citations omitted).
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of the bill has no legitimacy, the bill's force is considered to be purely a
creature of judicial decision-making.
jefferson has little analytic appeal. Its view of the separation of powers doctrine is too simplistic. Contrary to the jefferson rationale, a "revived" law is not the pure product of judicial decision-making. It is,
instead, a law that once gained the support of a legislature and that has
never been legislatively repealed. Its legitimacy rests on its initial legislative authorization. Moreover, the view that a statute that has been
found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed may have
had some support in the early case law, but it has been clearly rejected
by the Supreme Court. Instead of treating all statutes that it has found
unconstitutional as if they had never existed, the Court has recognized
a range of circumstances in which people who rely on an overturned
decision are protected. Indeed, as will be developed, the doctrine of
prospective overruling evolved to shield from harm those who relied
on subsequently overruled judicial decisions. 53 In short, the one case
in which there was a holding that a statute did not revive does not offer
a convincing rationale for nonrevival.
C.

Commentators

Commentators have generally agreed with the overwhelming majority of courts that an overruling decision has the effect of automatically reviving statutes. For example, Erica Frohman Plave observed
that revival was a necessary function of the limited scope of a judicial
determination of unconstitutionality: "Such laws [laws found unconstitutional] are merely unenforceable until such time as they are found
valid." 54 Professor Gerald Gunther has pronounced Attorney General
Cummings's conclusion that Adkins "simply 'suspend[ed]' enforcement"55 of the District of Columbia minimum wage statute "persuasive[],"56 and Professor Melville Nimmer similarly declared that "[i]t
seems clear that Attorney General Homer Cummings' opinion was correct."57 Finally, Professor Oliver Field noted that a statute that has
been found unconstitutional becomes enforceable when the case in
which it was held unconstitutional is reversed because "[a] declaration
of unconstitutionality does not operate as a repeal of a statute." 58
53. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text; see also text accompanying
notes 87-89 (discussing qualified immunity for government officials who rely on existing
law). One final point aboutjefferson merits mention: The Louisiana Supreme Court has
subsequently embraced the revival position, though it did so without overruling (or even
acknowledging) jefferson. See State v. Douglas, 278 So. 2d 485, 491 & n.6 (1973).
54. Erica Frohman Plave, Note, The Phenomenon of Antique Laws: Can a State
Revive Old Abortion Laws in a New Era?, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 111, 124 (1989).
55. Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 28 (12th ed. 1991) (quoting 39 Op. Att'y
Gen. 22, 22 (1937)).
56. See id.
57. Nimmer, supra note 41, at 1412.
58. Oliver P. Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute 10 (Di Capo Press
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All of these analyses rest on a problematic premise. Implicit in the
scholarly articles-and in the state judicial decisions and in the
Supreme Court case law previously discussed-is the idea that revival
1971) (1935). For other conclusions similar to those mentioned in the text, see Earl T.
Crawford, The Legislative Status of an Unconstitutional Statute, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 645,
651 ( 1951) ("The overruling decision removes the bar and the statute becomes
promptly effective without legislative re-enactment .... "); Paul B. Linton, Enforcement
of State Abortion Statutes after Roe: A State-by-State Analysis, 67 U. Det. L. Rev. 157,
237 (1990) (following Professor Field); Mark Graham, Note, State v. Douglas: Judicial
'Revival' of an Unconstitutional Statute, 34 La. L. Rev. 851 ( 1974) (arguing that statute
is revived when holding of unconstitutionality is reversed because initial holding merely
prevented enforcement of statute).
This Article focuses on the general question of whether a statute that is inconsistent
with a governing judicial decision becomes enforceable when that decision is reversed.
The issue of the potential revival of abortion statutes is used in this Article primarily to
illustrate the larger theoretical issues raised by this question. It should be added,
however, that there are other particularly strong arguments against revival of abortion
statutes. Indeed, the anti-revival position would be compelling if Roe were to be
overturned and an attempt were then made to enforce the pre-Roe criminal abortion
statutes remaining on the books. With respect to older abortion statutes (such as the
1855 criminal abortion statute at issue in Weeks), there is a strong argument that the
statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause because the "statutory objective ... reflects
archaic and stereotypic notions." Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
725 ( 1982). In addition, there is Supreme Court precedent indicating that, when
legislation is of marginal constitutionality, the statute will be enforced only if the
legislature considered the legislation's impact on constitutional interests. See Califano
v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 n.9 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Perhaps an actual,
considered legislative choice would be sufficient to allow this statute to be upheld, but
that is a question I would reserve until such a choice has been made."); Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959) (requiring showing that legislative body gave
"careful and purposeful consideration" to "decisions of great constitutional dimension
and import"); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) ("[I)f . . . 'liberty' is to be
regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making functions of the Congress."). Abortion
statutes passed by legislatures that had not considered the statutes' impact on women's
constitutional rights would then be unenforceable; with respect to pre-Roe statutes, it is
almost definitional that legislatures failed to consider relevant constitutional concerns.
Finally, there is a separation of powers issue when a long unenforced criminal statute
becomes enforced through the unilateral actions of executive branch prosecutors, rather
than because of a considered legislative judgment. For further development of these
arguments, see Brief of Amici Curiae NARAL at 21-41, Weeks v. Connick, 733 F. Supp.
1036 (E.D. La. 1990) (No. 73-469) [hereinafter NARAL Brief); Reva B. Siegel,
Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 356-57 & n.386 (1992); Teresa L.
Scott, Note, Burying the Dead: The Case Against Revival of Pre-Roe and Pre-Casey
Abortion Statutes in a Post-Casey World, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 355, 370-81
(1993). It should also be added that, if Roe were to be overturned, the argument that
due process bars prosecution of those women who had abortions before issuance of the
overruling decision would be compelling. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 570-71
( 1965) (holding that due process clause does not permit conviction of individuals who
demonstrated at site at which officials had told them they could demonstrate); Richard
H. Fallon, Jr. and Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1745 n.65 (1991) ("The retroactive application of a
new decision that effectively criminalized prior conduct that had been previously held
immune from prosecution would presumably deny due process.").
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reflects appropriate judicial deference to majoritarian decision-making.
The majority speaks when it passes the statute. For a time, the courts
may have blocked the majority's will. But, having determined that the
majority was in fact empowered to pass the statute originally, the court
should simply remove the bar on enforcement and, by allowing enforcement, permit the majority's will again to govern.
What this analysis misses is that the initial judicial opinion can have
a transformative effect on majoritarian decision-making. The fact that
''just about everybody was fooled" 5 9 is consequential. People generally
assume that a judicial decision is final or unlikely to be reversed and act
accordingly. That a statute remains on the books after it has been
found unconstitutional may say very little about what the majority of
the population currently thinks about that statute. Such a statute may
not be repealed even though it no longer has majoritarian support.
Part II develops this insight and its significance.
Moreover, there may be circumstances in which-given a statute
that is sufficiently constitutionally problematic to have been at one time
inconsistent with governing judicial interpretations of constitutional
law-it is appropriate to force the legislature to reconsider its position
on the statute itself. This is the topic of Part III of this Article.
II.

PoLITICAL RELIANCE

The law promotes reliance on judicial decisions through various
doctrines. When courts adopt new rules oflaw, they are able to protect
those individuals who have acted in reliance on the old rule of law
through prospective overruling. In tort suits, limited immunity shields
government officials who relied on an old rule oflaw. A primary end of
stare decisis is to safeguard those who have relied on judicial decisions.
An invalidating judicial decision affects the political decisions that
people make. Opponents of a statute that has been either held to be
unconstitutional or that is unconstitutional under a rule of law that a
court has announced in invalidating another statute take the invalidating decision into account as they decide whether to spend their political
capital on repeal. Political actors have a finite set of resources that they
can deploy to influence legislative (and other) processes; the invalidating decision affects the way those resources-their political capital-are
spent. In reliance on the invalidating decision, political actors are likely
not to seek repeal or not to seek it vigorously. Similarly, they are likely
not to focus their efforts on opposing a proposed new statute that
would be unenforceable under the invalidating decision. Such political
reliance on the invalidating decision is at least as deserving of protection as other reliance interests that are currently protected by the law.
To protect such political reliance, in certain circumstances courts
59. Jawish v. Mor1et, 86 A.2d 96,97 (D.C. 1952) (quoting Warring v. Co1poys, 122
F.2d 642, 646 (D.C.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 678 (1941)).
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should be able to use the technique of prospective overruling in evaluating the enforceability of statutes. In other words, when there has
been political reliance on an invalidating decision that is subsequently
overturned, a court should have the power to evaluate a statute's enforceability using the rule of law enunciated in the invalidating decision, rather than the rule of law set forth in the overruling decision.
The overruling decision would then operate only prospectively-permitting enforcement of a statute passed after, but not one passed
before, its announcement.
The judicial power to apply the overruling decision only prospectively can be justified on choice of law grounds. The new rule of law is,
under this approach, almost like a constitutional amendment, and constitutional amendments have been held not to validate statutes passed
prior to the amendment's ratification (unless they were intended to do
so). A better approach, however, is to regard prospective overruling as
an exercise of the judicial power to fashion appropriate constitutional
remedies. Under this approach, the question of whether to apply the
technique of prospective overruling will turn on the equities of the situation. We conclude this part with a discussion of when prospective
overruling is appropriate. Specifically, we will argue that, with respect
to potential revival of a particular statute, a court should take account
of: ( 1) the amount of time between the invalidating decision and the
overruling decision; (2) how clear it was that the statute at issue was
unconstitutional under the invalidating decision; (3) the relative timing
of the statute's passage and the relevant judicial decisions.
A.

The Effect of a Finding of Unconstitutionality on the Political Process

When a court finds a statute unconstitutional and bars its enforcement, it alters the stakes involved in that statute's repeal. The decision
also alters the stakes involved in passage of a new statute, if that statute
is clearly unconstitutional under the rule of law enunciated in the decision. Because the stakes are altered, the operations of the political
processes are altered. Political actors know that, at least in the short
term, a statute that has been found unconstitutional or that is clearly
unconstitutional under governing case law will not be enforced. Given
our legal system's respect for precedent, they also know that the statute
is presumptively unenforceable in the long term. Indeed, political actors may act as if overruling were not a possibility, as if the statute
would never be enforceable.
It is hard to mobilize either the legislative or popular support
needed to secure the repeal of a statute when it is unenforced and when
it has been pronounced unconstitutional. If doctors who performed
abortions were being sentenced to ten years of hard labor, as the
Louisiana statute at issue in Weeks permitted, there would have been
ongoing testing as to whether that result was one desired by the people
of Louisiana. But because of Roe there was no enforcement of the stat-
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ute and hence no rallying point for repeal. As the Maryland Supreme
Court suggested in johnson v. State, 60 inertia can keep statutes pronounced unconstitutional on the books, regardless of whether or not
they have current majoritarian support:
[A]n unconstitutional act is not a law for any purpose, cannot
confer any right, cannot be relied upon as a manifestation of
legislative intent, and, "is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425,442, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 30 L.Ed. 178 (1886);
Chicago, Ind. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566-67,
33 S.Ct. 581, 57 L.Ed. 966 (1913). Because of this principle,
legislative bodies often fail to repeal unconstitutional statutes,
deeming them obsolete matter which can be later deleted in
the course of a general revision or recodification of the laws
on the particular subject. 61
The story of New York Assemblyman George Michaels and his vote
on the 1970 measure to repeal New York's criminal abortion statute
illustrates how differently the political process can function when decisions have immediate consequences. Michaels represented a district
that was sixty-five percent Catholic, and he decided that in order to
save his seat he had to vote against repeal. Nonetheless, his family had
urged him to vote to eliminate the existing statute. His son, an intern
in a Cincinnati ghetto, had told him of the suffering that he had seen
caused by illegal abortions. When Michaels told his wife that his
planned vote was inconsequential since repeal would inevitably occur
in a few years, she replied, "In the meantime, thousands of women will
be butchered in underworld abortion[s]." 62
Despite these arguments, Michaels initially voted to keep the criminal abortion statute on the books, and then, as the vote concluded but
before it was finalized, realized that repeal would lose by one vote. Just
before the final tally was announced, Michaels took the floor. The New
York Times reported:
Assemblyman George M. Michaels of Auburn, his hands trembling and tears welling in his eyes, stopped the roll-call only
seconds before the clerk was to announce that the reform bill
had been defeated for lack of a single vote .... "I realize, Mr.
Speaker," Mr. Michaels said, "that I am terminating my political career, but I cannot in good conscience sit here and allow
my vote to be the one that defeats this bill-I ask that my vote
be changed from "no" to "yes. " 63
For Assemblyman Michaels, recognition of the consequential nature of
60. 315 A.2d 524 (Md. 1974).
61. Id. at 528.
62. Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes 48 (1990) (quoting from
Lawrence Lader, Abortion II: Making the Revolution 145 (1973)).
63. Id. (quoting from Bill Kovach, Abortion Reform Is Voted by the Assembly, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 10, 1970, at I).
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his vote powerfully influenced what he did. Clearly, if Roe had been the
law of the land in 1970, Michaels would have voted against repeal.
A judicial decision invalidating a statute also skews the political dynamic because, as a result of that decision, proponents and opponents
of the statute will attach different levels of symbolic importance to its
repeal. Similarly, they will attach different levels of symbolic importance to the passage of new statutes that are also unconstitutional
under the invalidating decision. Again, the skewing favors the proponents of the invalidated statute. The proponents, having lost in the
courts, place a premium on legislative endorsement of their position:
the legislature alone can provide a statement in favor of their views by
an official governmental actor. Opponents of a statute will attach less
symbolic value to what the legislature does. For them, the effect of legislative endorsement will only be cumulative, since the courts have already embraced their position.
This difference in symbolic importance for the two sides can alter
the political process so that it produces a result inconsistent with majority wishes. A legislator will incur the enmity of those who support an
"unconstitutional" bill by working for its repeal or opposing similar
legislation; she is unlikely to win offsetting support from the bill's opponents. The fate of an Arkansas statute that required public schools
to allocate as much time to the teaching of creation science as to evolution illustrates this phenomenon. Although understood to be unconstitutional, the statute was passed by the legislature almost without
discussion. 64 The President Pro Tempore of the Senate explained,
"[l]t was meaningless, just a piece of junk, so why not vote for it." 65
Had opponents of the bill attached as much importance to blocking it
as proponents did to ensuring its passage, the Senator would not have
made that statement. But because the statute's symbolic importance
was different for the two camps, he voted in favor of the bill.
Thus far the discussion has concerned the ways in which the invalidating decision creates incentives that work both against the repeal of
existing statutes that are unenforceable under the invalidating decision
and in favor of the passage of similarly unenforceable statutes. It is also
important to recognize that there are ways in which the invalidating
decision simply alters the political calculus in ways that make it impossible to determine whether a particular statute would be on the books if
the invalidating decision had never been issued. One can imagine a
range of responses on both sides to an invalidating decision. Because
of the decision, opponents of the statute might devote little energy to
its repeal and focus instead on, say, the repeal of enforceable statutes
that they oppose. Supporters of the "unconstitutional" statute might
64. See Allan C. Hutchinson & Derek Morgan, Ca1abresian Sunset: Statutes in the
Shade, 82 Co1um. L. Rev. 1752, 1763 n.36 (1982) (reviewing Guido Ca1abresi, A
Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982)).
65. Id. at 1764 (quoting President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Ben Allen).
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focus their energy on passing legislation of marginal constitutionality in
order to test the exact contours of the invalidating decision. Alternately, opponents of a statute might think reversal of the invalidating
decision sufficiently likely that they will devote more resources to repeal than will proponents of the statute, who may assess the likelihood
of reversal differently or who may choose to pursue other ends for strategic reasons. What is clear, however, is that, after the invalidating judicial decision is issued, political actors take it into account and the
decision thereby affects the political process.
Two leading constitutional law cases further illustrate the operation of political reliance. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 66 was the last
triumph of the brief heyday of Radical Reconstruction. Indeed, the
bill was passed after the electoral tide had shifted: A Republicandominated Congress enacted it in March 1875, days before the Democrats who had won control of the House in the 1874 election took their
seats. 67 That statute provides for criminal penalties for racial discrimination in public accommodations and for civil penalties for such discrimination without the need of securing injunctive relief. The
Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional in 1883 in the Civil Rights
Cases ,68 stating that neither the Thirteenth nor the Fourteenth Amendment provided Congress with the power to enact the legislation. 69
Since that time the statute has been unenforced. 7 ° Current case law
makes it clear that Congress has the power to ban such discrimination
under the Commerce Clause. 71 If a statute that has been found uncon66. ActofMarch l, l875,ch.ll4, l8Stat.,335(l875). Sections3and4oftheact
have been repealed. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 862, (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 44-45) (1988). Sections l and 2 of the Act have never been
repealed, while Section 5 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1984 (1988). See Historical Note to
42 U.S.C.A. § 1984 (West 1981) (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 has been
codified at this section but is not printed because it is "obsolete," the Supreme Court
having held it unconstitutional). For a discussion of the Act and its history, see Nimmer,
supra note 41, at 1394-98.
67. See Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877,
at 553-56 (1988).
68. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
69. See id. at 25 ("On the whole we are of opinion, that no countenance of
authority for the passage of the law in question can be found in either the Thirteenth or
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution; and no other ground of authority for its
passage being suggested, it must necessarily be declared void .... ").
70. See Historical Note to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1984 (West 1981); Nimmer, supra note
41, at 1394-98.
71. The leading case on point is Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964). Heart of Atlanta did not overrule the Civil Rights Cases. Rather, it
distinguished them on the grounds that the defenders of the statute in the earlier case
had not based their claim of federal power on the Commerce Clause, relying instead on
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 252. At the same time, it
indicated that those providing public accommodations in 1881 might not have been
engaged in interstate commerce, but that by 1964 (the time of the Heart of .1tlanta
decision), they were so engaged. See id. at 251.
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stitutional can be revived by subsequent case law, the statute would
presumably be enforceable today. But given the enduring powers of
segregationist forces in national politics in the years after 1883 and
through much of the twentieth century, it is almost inconceivable that
the statute would not have been repealed if it had been perceived as a
possibility that it might become enforceable, and yet it has never been
repealed.
More recently, the response to Roe demonstrates the consequences
of political reliance. In the years from 1967 to 1973, the period immediately before Roe was handed down, nineteen states reformed their
abortion laws. 72 By apparently ending the need for this process, Roe
also largely ended the process itself, as the seventeen unenforced but
unrepealed pre-Roe criminal abortion statutes suggest. 73 When Roe
was announced, one Planned Parenthood official recalled a decade
later, "Most of us really believed that was the end of the controversy.
The Supreme Court had spoken, and while some disagreement would
remain, the issue had been tried, tested and laid to rest. " 74 Instead of
fighting over repeal of unenforceable pre-Roe statutes, pro-choice and
pro-life forces in the wake of Roe primarily struggled over whether
there should be a constitutional amendment on abortion and over legal
issues that Roe had left open; this was particularly true in the years
before 1980, when President Reagan's election suggested that, through
new appointments to the Supreme Court, Roe might be overturned.
Thus, at the federal level, the post-Roe congressional debate in the
years before 1980 largely focused on federal funding for abortions. At
the state level, debate centered on whether legislation should be enacted that burdened a woman's attempt to exercise the right Roe
recognized. 75
Roe skewed the political process in two additional ways. First, as
Professor Tribe has observed:
[The pro-life movement] harnessed the power of single-issue
politics to elect public officials who believed, as they did, that
abortion was murder and that it should be outlawed. Ironically, Roe contributed to the success of [the pro-life] movement because it prevented government from legislatively
restricting access to abortion. Those who did not agree with
the right-to-life position thus could vote for pro-life candidates with whom they otherwise agreed without concern that
antiabortion views would actually be enacted into enforceable
laws. 76
72. See Tribe, supra note 62, at 49 (citing Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and
Divorce in Western Law (1987)).
73. See 1993 NARAL, supra note 5, at vi.
74. See Flora Davis, Moving the Mountain: The Women's Movement in America
Since 1960, at 181 (1991) (quoting Planned Parenthood executive).
75. See Tribe, supra note 62, at 139-60.
76. Id. at 16. Professor Tribe assumes that pro-life and pro-choice voters behave
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Tribe's point here is bolstered by the fact that Webster produced the
opposite result. A National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL)
survey conducted in 1989, shortly after the decision in Webster, concluded that only twenty-three of the ninety-nine state legislative bodies
favored keeping abortion legal. After Webster suggested that Roe was
imperiled, pro-choice support at the state legislative level grew dramatically. In 1993, NARAL determined that fifty state legislative bodies
supported legalized abortion. 77
Second, by making a class of abortion legislation unenforceable,
Roe ironically made such legislation easier to pass. In his amicus brief
in Webster, Solicitor General Charles Fried observed about this process:
[B]ecause legislators know that whatever they enact in this
area will be subject to de novo review by the courts, they have
little incentive to try to moderate their positions. The result,
all too often, has been statutes that are significant primarily
because of their highly "inflammatory" symbolic content. ...
This process has undermined the accountability of legislative
bodies and has disserved the courts and the Constitution. 78
Like Arkansas's creation science statute, then, these "unconstitutional"
abortion statutes show that proponents of an unconstitutional statute
attach greater importance to passing such statutes for symbolic reasons
than their opponents attach to blocking them.
Thus, the four cases surveyed-Assemblyman Michaels and New
York's abortion statute, the Arkansas Senator and creation science, the
political responses to the Civil Rights Cases and Roe-illustrate the critical points about political reliance. First, those who oppose the invalidated statute-those, in other words, who are sympathetic to the
invalidating decision-rely on the invalidating decision as they conduct
their political activities. Second, judicial invalidation of a statute affects
majoritarian political deliberation in a way that makes it incorrect to
differently: During a period in which it is clear that a woman's right to an abortion
receives significant constitutional protection, pro-life voters are more likely to vote on
the basis of a candidate's stand on abortion than are pro-choice voters. This assumption
makes sense if pro-life voters are more likely to be one-issue voters than are pro-choice
voters. We believe this assumption is correct, but Tribe's insight is not necessarily
generalizable to revival issues outside of the abortion context. In other areas, it may be
the case that opponents of a statute that has been held unconstitutional are more likely
to judge a candidate on the basis of her stand on that statute than are proponents of the
statute.
77. See 1993 NARAL, supra note 5, at v.
78. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21 n.l5, Webster v. Reproductive
Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605); see also NARAL Brief, supra note 58, at
24 (quoting language in the Solicitor General's brief in ll"ebster as evidence that abortion
decisions had a "distortive effect" on the political process); Guido Calabresi, The
Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional
Accountability (What the Bark-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 Harv. L. Rev. 80, 147
n.220 (1991) (skewing effect of Roe and its progeny on political process may make
revival of abortion statutes counter-majoritarian); Scott, supra note 58, at 368-70
(discussing quoted language from Solicitor General's brief in Webster).
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assume that either the failure to repeal an "unconstitutional" statute or
the passage of an "unconstitutional" statute after a court has established a rule under which that statute is unconstitutional accurately reflects the will of the current majority. Third, not only does judicial
invalidation affect the political process, it tends to do so in a particular
way, tilting the process towards the retention and passage of"unconstitutional" statutes.
B. Protection of Reliance Interests
As has been pointed out, courts have not recognized political reliance as an interest that merits protection when they determine to overrule a decision. In other areas of constitutional law, however, courts
recognize that individuals who order their affairs in reliance on judicial
decisions have a claim to protection, and doctrines have been developed that protect such reliance.
Stare decisis is such a doctrine. While the scope and rationale of
stare decisis are the subject of great debate among commentators and
in the courts, 79 as Professor Earl Maltz has observed, "The most commonly heard justification for the doctrine of stare decisis rests on the
need for certainty in the law. In planning their affairs, it is argued, people should be able to predict the legal consequences of their actions." 80
In Justice Harlan's words, stare decisis advances the "predictability required for the ordering of human affairs over the course of time." 81
Even for Chief Justice Rehnquist, who has a constrained notion of the
value of stare decisis, 82 reliance on judicial decisions merits protection
and is a principal ground for the doctrine of stare decisis. Thus, in
Payne v. Tennessee, the Chief Justice observed:
Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal
79. For an analysis of Supreme Court Justices' competing conceptions of stare
decisis, see Gerhardt, supra note 21, at 114-31. For recent scholarly analyses of the
doctrine's role, see, e.g., id. at 131-45 (examining the implications of the Justice's
individual approaches to precedent); Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 724 (1988) (concluding that
"original understanding must give way in the face of transformative or longstanding
precedent"); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 595 (1987) (examining
the role of precedent outisde sphere of legal doctrine and within law); Geoffrey R.
Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional Doctrine,
11 Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 67, 67 (1988) (discussing the circumstances under which the
Supreme Court may appropriately overrule a major constitutional decision).
80. Earl M. Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 367, 368 (1988); see
also Schauer, supra note 79, at 597 ("The most commonly offered of the substantive
reasons for choosing strong over weak precedential constraint is the principle of
predictability"); Stone, supra note 79, at 70 ("doctrine of precedent ... [advances]
predictability in our affairs").
81. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 127 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
82. See Gerhardt, supra note 21, at 128-31 (viewing Rehnquist as maintaining that
"precedents carry little weight in and of themselves in decision-making").
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principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process. 83
The ChiefJustice thus believes that the presence of reliance makes the
case for stare decisis most compelling: "Considerations in favor of
stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract
rights, where reliance interests are involved; the opposite is true in
cases ... involving procedural and evidentiary rules." 84 In publicly
explaining his decision in Payne, Chief Justice Rehnquist has indicated
that the basis for this distinction is his belief that "few criminals would
base their decision to commit a crime" on Supreme Court evidentiary
precedent, but that people making decisions on property and contracts
issues do take such precedent into account. 85
Even assuming that ChiefJustice Rehnquist is correct as an empirical matter about whether criminals rely on precedent, there is no logical reason why the only reliance worthy of protection should be that
involving decisions regarding contracts or property. Individuals rely
on judicial decisions as they make noneconomic decisions, just as they
do when they make economic decisions, and the former class of choices
are at least as deserving of protection as the latter. The plurality opinion in Casey recognized this point, advancing it as a principal ground for
its decision to embrace the doctrine of stare decisis and not to overturn
Roe:
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized intimate relationships and made choices
that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that
contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.
The Constitution serves human values, and while the effect of
reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither can the
certain cost of overruling Roe for people who have ordered
their thinking and living around that case be dismissed. 86
83. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991) (majority opinion).
84. Id. at 2610.
85. Tony Mauro, Courtside: Marshall: Scant Mementos, Scattered Clerks, Legal
Times, July 15, 1991, at 8, 9, quoted in Gerhardt, supra note 21, at 129.
86. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809 (1992) (plurality opinion).
But see Earl M. Maltz, Abortion, Precedent and the Constitution: A Comment on
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 11, 18-32
(1992) (criticizing Casey plurality's approach to stare decisis).
Given Justice Rehnquist's narrow view of protected reliance interests, see supra
notes 82-85 and accompanying text, it is not surprising that in his dissent in Casey he
criticized the plurality's protection of this reliance interest. He wrote:
As the joint opinion apparently agrees, any traditional notion of reliance is not
applicable here .... The joint opinion thus turns to what can only be described
as an unconventional-and unconvincing-notion of reliance, a view based on
the surmise that the availability of abortion since Roe has led to "two decades of
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Courts have also protected reliance interests in deciding cases concerning constitutional torts. Government officials are protected from
liability when their actions are consistent with then-existing judicial interpretations, even if those interpretations subsequently change. Thus,
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 87 the Court held "government officials performing discretionary functions [] generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." 88 According to the Harlow majority, the costs of
not shielding government officials from tort liability include "distraction ... from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service." 89
Finally, reliance interests have been protected when courts have
prospectively overruled preceding judicial decisions (or, to put it another way, when they have applied the doctrine of non-retroactivity).
When courts prospectively overrule an earlier decision, they refrain
from applying the new law to events that predate its announcement. As
Chief Justice Burger wrote in his plurality opinion in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 90 nonretroactivity reflects the notion that "statutory or even
judge-made rules of law are hard facts on which people must rely in
making their decisions and in shaping their conduct." 91
The original jurisprudential basis for the opposing doctrine that a
decision on constitutionality must be applied retroactively is evidenced
by the Supreme Court's decision in Norton v. Shelby County. 92 (This is
the case that the Maryland Supreme Court invoked, in the language we
have previously quoted from Johnson v. State, to explain why legislators
do not always repeal statutes that are found unconstitutional.) 93 Norton
involved a suit by bondholders who sought to enforce payments of
bonds issued by the Shelby County Board of Commissioners. The
Commissioners had been appointed pursuant to a state statute that the
economic and social developments" that would be undercut if the error of Roe
were recognized.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2861-62 (citations omitted) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
87. 457 u.s. 800 (1982).
88. ld. at 818; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 534-35 (1985) (although
his actions violated Fourth Amendment, former Attorney General entitled to qualified
immunity; Court observes that, at time of Attorney General's actions, two district court
opinions suggested they were legal); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 193-95 (1984)
(noting that defendant's conduct was constitutional under law of circuit as reason for
granting qualified immunity). See generally Fallo & Meltzer, supra note 58, at 1749-53
(discussing qualified immunity in constitutional tort actions).
89. 457 U.S. at 816. But see Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
Yale LJ. 1425, 1485-88 (1987) (criticizing granting immunity for government officials
as removing necessary check).
90. 411 u.s. 192 (1973).
91. Id. at 199 (plurality opinion).
92. 118 u.s. 425 (1886).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
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Tennessee Supreme Court found-after the bonds were issued-to be
violative of the state constitution. In rejecting the bondholders' claims,
United States Supreme Court Justice Field asserted: "An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed. " 94 The bondholders
thus had no cognizable claim because, from a legal point of view, the
bond-issuing authority had never existed. Norton came to stand for a
proposition that was as applicable to overruling decisions as to the effect of judicial holdings of statutory unconstitutionality: any reliance
on the law as it appeared prior to the ultimate judicial ruling would not
be protected. 95
There were a few nineteenth century cases in which courts, rejecting the implications of Norton, applied their decisions prospectively,96 but frequent use of the doctrine of prospective overruling
began only after it was championed by Benjamin Cardozo. 97 In his
1921 book, The Nature of the judicial Process, Cardozo wrote:
[I]n the vast majority of cases the retrospective effect of judgemade law is felt either to involve no hardship or only such
hardship as is inevitable where no rule has been declared. I
think it is significant that when the hardship is felt to be too
great or to be unnecessary, retrospective operation is withheld. Take the cases where a court of final appeal has declared
a statute void, and afterwards, reversing itself, declares the
statute valid. Intervening transactions have been governed by
the first decision. What shall be said of the validity of such
transactions when the decision is overruled? Most courts in a
spirit of realism have held that the operation of the statute has
been suspended in the interval. It may be hard to square such
a ruling with abstract dogmas and definitions. When so much
else that a court does, is done with retroactive force, why draw
the line here? The answer is, I think, that the line is drawn
here, because the injustice and oppression of a refusal to draw
it would be so great as to be intolerable. 98
Having argued as a scholar for prospective overruling, Cardozo as
94. 118 U.S. at 442.
95. See Oliver P. Field, supra note 58, at 1-2; Plave, supra note 54, at 115.
96. See Schaefer, supra note 26, at 2 (citing Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445
(1848)). In addition, in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (l Wall.) 175 (1863), and
related municipal bond cases, the Supreme Court ruled on constitutional grounds that
states could not give overruling decisions retroactive effect if that would cause the
impairment of vested or contractual rights. See generally Walter V. Schaefer, The
Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 631,
631-41 (1967) (discussing early cases and scholarly arguments concerning prospective
application of decisions).
97. See Schaefer, supra note 26, at 3.
98. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 146-47 (1921)
(citations omitted).
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a Justice pronounced it constitutional in Great Northern Railway Co. v.
Sunburst Oil & Refining Co . .99 The Montana Supreme Court in a 1921
decision had held that shippers could recover the overcharge for excessive rates. Sunburst then sued Great Northern Railway to recover such
an overcharge. The Montana Supreme Court overruled the decision
that would have authorized Sunburst's recovery, but also elected not to
apply that result retroactively. Thus, Sunburst prevailed because the
Court applied the rule established in the earlier case. But the Court
also found that rule inapplicable to future claimants. The railroad contended that the Montana Supreme Court decision violated due process.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Cardozo stated:
We think the federal constitution has no voice upon the subject [of whether a new rule must be applied retroactively]. A
state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may
make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. It may say that decisions
of its highest court, though later overruled, are law none the
less for intermediate transactions. Indeed there are cases intimating, too broadly that it must give them that effect; but never
has doubt been expressed that it may so treat them if it pleases,
whenever injustice or hardship will thereby be averted. 100
The doctrine of prospective overruling assumed new prominence
in 1965 with the Supreme Court's decision in Linkletter v. Walker. 101 In
Linkletter, the Court decided not to give full retroactive effect to its decision in Mapp v. Ohio 102 that state courts had to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Two years later, in
Stovall v. Denno, 103 the Court specified the factors to be used in determining when a decision should be retroactive: "(a) the purpose to be
served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new
standards." 104
The Stovall test influenced the Supreme Court's formulation in
99. 287 u.s. 358, 364 (1932).
100. ld. (citation omitted).
101. 381 U.S. 618 (1965), overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 320-28
(1987).
102. 367 u.s. 643, 654-55 (1961).
103. 388 u.s. 293 (1967).
104. Id. at 297. Although it has been extended to civil cases, this test is no longer
applied in the criminal context. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)
(complete retroactive application of new law to cases pending on direct review). For
discussion of Griffith, see infra notes 125-127 and accompanying text. As Griffith
indicates, prospective overruling has provoked controversy among members of the
Court and it has not been consistently applied. The Justices have disagreed as to when
the technique should be used and, more fundamentally, as to whether it is legitimate.
The relevant case law and criticism are discussed infra at notes 155-140 and
accompanying text; that part of the Article also presents our defense of prospective
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Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson 105 of the approach to be employed in the civil
context to determine whether a decision should be retroactively
applied:
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied or by deciding an
issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, it has been stressed that "we must ...
weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the
prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect,
and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its
operation." Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by
retroactive application, for "[ w]here a decision of this Court
could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity." 106
Chevron Oil involved a civil statute, rather than the Constitution. In
American Trucking Ass 'ns v. Smith, 107 however, a four-member plurality of
the Court, led by Justice O'Connor, held that the Chevron Oil test governed when the overruling decision reversed an opinion interpreting
the Constitution. In applying Chevron Oil, Justice O'Connor justified
prospective overruling as a means to avoid hurting those who had relied on the prior decision: "When the Court concludes that a lawchanging decision should not be applied retroactively, its decision is
usually based on its perception that such application would have a
harsh and disruptive effect on those who relied on prior law." 108
overruling (and, specifically, of prospective overruling in the statutory context) as an
exercise of the judicial remedial function.
It should be noted that in the area of habeas corpus, the Court has ruled that a
petition that either rests on or seeks enunciation of a new rule of law will normally be
dismissed. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989); see also Fallon & Metzer,
supra note 58, at 1746-49 (discussing Teague and subsequent case law). But see Marc
M. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Courts after Teague v. Lane, 69
N.C. L. Rev. 371, 395-99 (1991) (providing a narrow reading of Teague). Habeas,
however, raises unique issues. Thus, Justice Harlan, despite his criticism of prospective
overruling in cases involving direct review, believed that the fact that habeas was an
extraordinary remedy and the importance of finality in criminal convictions meant that
new rules should generally not be applied in the habeas context. See Fallon & Meltzer,
supra note 58, at 1743-44 (discussing Justice Harlan's view of habeas and new rules).
105. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
106. Id. at 106-07 (citations omitted). For Justice White's broad endorsement of
the Chevron test, see James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, Ill S. Ct. 2439, 2449
(1991) (White, J., concurring); for Justice O'Connor's, see id. at 2451 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); see also American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 191 (1990)
(plurality opinion).
107. 496 u.s. 167 (1990).
108. Id. at 191.
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Prospective Overruling and Political Reliance

There is thus ample precedent in the law for the notion that judicial decisions should protect at least some reliance interests. Is political
reliance an interest that should be protected, and if so, how should protection be achieved?
We recognize that not all reliance interests merit protection.
Notwithstanding justice Rehnquist's comments to the contrary, a criminal might well argue against a change in the evidentiary rules on the
grounds that she had, in fact, taken the current rules into account in
deciding to commit a crime. 109 It seems unlikely, however, that we
would want to shield her from the consequences of the rule change; the
purpose of rules that limit the kind of evidence that the state can introduce is not to empower the criminal, but to restrain the constable. In
contrast, there are compelling reasons for encouraging political
reliance.
To promote efficient political activity and to encourage deference
to judicial decision-making, the judiciary should wish to encourage
majoritarian bodies to interpret the Constitution in the same way as it
does. Revival encourages what is in effect a form of legislative nonacquiescence. It gives critics of a judicial decision a strong incentive to
oppose repeal of the invalidated statute and to work for the passage of
legislation inconsistent with that decision. In the vast majority of cases,
the battles over "unconstitutional" legislation will entail a squandering
of political resources. Because our legal system attaches a heavy weight
to precedent, relatively few invalidating decisions will be overturned.
Thus, a significant amount of legislative energy will be devoted to matters of no practical importance. At the same time, revival encourages
political actors to behave as if judicial decisions are transitory in nature
and thus undermines faith in their finality.
Revival of previously invalidated statutes penalizes those who make
good faith judgments in reliance on the rule of law enunciated in the
invalidating decision. As previously pointed out, statutes that are at
odds with the invalidating decision may remain on the books or be
passed when, in the absence of the invalidating decision, they would
have been repealed or defeated. While the law protects reliance interests out of a deep concern for fairness, in the belief that those who
structure lawful activity aroundjudicial pronouncements should not be
hurt by subsequent judicial decisions to alter the rule of law, non protection of political reliance leads to outcomes that are both consequential and unfair.
A variant on Weeks 110 illustrates the unfairness that can ensue when
109. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
110. Weeks v. Connick, 733 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. La. 1990).
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statutes are revived. Let us assume that Casey 111 had reversed Roe 11 2
and that Weeks had been brought after Roe had been reversed. Revival
in this context would have rendered the 134-year-old statute-which
may well have been on the books only because it was unenforced-automatically enforceable. Pursuant to the terms of the statute, any district attorney anywhere in the state could have prosecuted any doctor
performing abortions in the state for a felony carrying a ten-year jail
sentence. The threat of such prosecution could have closed all the
abortion clinics in the state, forcing the physician, nurse, and counsellor employed there to seek other employment. At some point after enforcement began the statute might have been repealed or modified.
But the disruption caused by enforcement would have had long-term
consequences; eventual repeal could not restore the status quo ante. 113
There are, then, important reasons to protect political reliance.
But how can such protection be achieved? The answer to this question
lies in extending the doctrine of prospective overruling, which is currently limited to events that predate judicial announcement of the new
rule of law, making it applicable to statutes whose passage predates the
judicial announcement of the new rule of law. In other words, courts
should be able to use this doctrine in evaluating statutes passed before
the overruling decision. Such prospective overruling would deal precisely with the harms associated with the failure to protect political reliance. It would allow courts to prevent the enforcement of statutes that
may not reflect current majoritarian will. It would prevent the squandering of political resources. And it would bolster rather than undermine judicial authority, ensuring the fair treatment of those who base
their behavior on judicial interpretations of the law. 114
Ill. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
112. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
113. Another way in which the statute would have had a chilling effect stems from
the fact that by definition, the Louisiana legislators who had passed the statute were
unfamiliar with subsequent developments. Thus, the 1855 law did not speak to matters
such as whether contraceptives like IUDs that prevented implantation are abortifacients
and hence subject to severe criminal penalties. Until the reach of the law was clarified
(or until the law itself was repealed), then, use of IUDs might have been substantially
discouraged.
As previously noted, see supra note 13, after Weeks the Louisiana legislature
amended and partially re-enacted its criminal abortion statute. The provision
concerning abortifacients, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:88 (West 1986), was not re-enacted.
Under the post-Weeks statute, doctors who perform abortions in cases other than rape or
incest or to save the life of the mother are subject to criminal prosecution. See La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 14:87 (West Supp. 1993). This is a narrower statute than the original,
which did not contain these exceptions. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:87 (West 1986).
114. In this regard, it is possible to imagine the following counterargument against
prospective overruling: Prospective overruling will destroy the incentives and the
opportunity for legislatures to engage in a dialogue with courts about whether the
invalidating decision should be overturned. Adherents of this argument would ask: why
would a legislature pass a statute that is unenforceable under the invalidating decision?
If the legislature has no incentive to do so, won't that undercut the court's ability to have
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Prospective overruling is best conceptualized as an exercise of a
court's remedial powers designed to protect those who have relied on
judicial pronouncements. It is analogous to the constitutional tort
cases that hold that a government actor who relies on official pronouncements will be shielded from harm if those pronouncements are
in error or if the law changes. 115 The relevant pronouncement in a
revival case is the initial invalidating decision; the remedy is to deny
enforcement of the once-unconstitutional statute unless it is repassed.
It is also possible to view prospective overruling as a choice of law
doctrine, rather than as an exercise of a court's remedial powers.
Under this conception of prospective overruling, courts assessing the
constitutionality of a statute must decide whether to apply "new" constitutional law or "old" constitutional law; prospective overruling
would involve application of the "old" law. This approach accords with
that adopted by Justice O'Connor in her plurality decision in American
Trucking in determining which law to apply to events that preceded the
overruling decision. "In those relatively rare circumstances where established precedent is overruled," she stated, "the doctrine of nonretroactivity allows a court ... to avoid 'jolting the expectations of parties
to a transaction.' " 116
The argument for the choice oflaw approach is strongest when the
"new law" reflects a judicial determination that the meaning of the
Constitution has changed because of changes in societal circumstances,
rather than a judicial determination that its initial holding was in error.
The plurality opinion in Casey suggests that it would be possible to read
a vehicle to revisit the invalidating decision? Also, won't prospective overruling deny
legislatures the means they need to signal the courts that a particular statute enjoys
current m~oritarian support? The answer to this argument is that the possibility of
prospective overruling gives those who oppose an invalidating decision adequate
incentive and opportunity to engage in such dialogue with the judiciary. By passing a
statute that is unenforceable under the invalidating decision, the legislature can provide
the court with the opportunity to overrule its invalidating decision. Even if the
"unconstitutional" statute has to be repassed after the overturning decision to be
enforceable, there is a strong reason for its proponents to pass it, because it provides a
vehicle for reversal.
115. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 4 72 U.S. 511 (1985) (holding Attorney General
immune from liability for authorizing warrantless wiretaps because unclear that they
were unconstitutional at the time of authorization); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183
(1984) (state officials enjoy qualified immunity unless actions violate constitutional right
clearly established at time of challenged conduct); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
( 1982) (government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded
from liability to the extent that their actions do not violate clear constitutional or
statutory rights).
116. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 196 (1990) (plurality
opinion) (O'Connor, j.) (citation omitted); see also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia, Ill S. Ct. 2439, 2451 (1991) (O'Connor,]., dissenting) (Chevron Oil sets forth
the process by which the Supreme Court determines "whether the new law or the old is
to apply to conduct occurring before the law-changing decision").
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the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 117 overruling Plessy v.
Ferguson, 11 B in this light:
The Plessy Court considered "the underlying fallacy of the
plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it."
The Court in Brown addressed these facts of life by observing that whatever may have been the understanding in
Plessy's time of the power of segregation to stigmatize those
who were segregated with a "badge of inferiority," it was clear
by 1954 that legally sanctioned segregation had just such an
effect, to the point that racially separate public educational facilities were deemed inherently unequal. . . . While we think
Plessy was wrong the day it was decided, we must also recognize that the Plessy Court's explanation for its decision was so
clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the Court in 1954
that the decision to re-examine Plessy was on this ground alone
not only justified but required. . . . In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose
new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could
accept each decision to overrule a prior case as a response to
the Court's constitutional duty. 11 9
If Roe 120 were ever to be overturned, a similar argument could be
made. Dean Calabresi has recently suggested that Roe may be best understood as a decision that involved the protection of women as a
group that had been largely excluded from the legislative process and
that the Court might legitimately revise or reverse Roe if it determined
that this were no longer the case. 121 Thus, factual changes would be
the occasion for reversing the initial decision, and the initial decision
would not have been erroneous when it was made.
Our point here is not to argue for specific readings of Roe or Plessy.
It is, rather, to suggest that when a decision is overruled because material societal facts have changed, the argument for nonrevival on choice
oflaw grounds is compelling. A choice oflaw approach would render a
statute enforceable only if it were enacted at a time when the factual
preconditions for the statute to be constitutional were satisfied. Analo117. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
118. 163 u.s. 537 (1896).
119. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2813 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(citations omitted).
120. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
121. See Calabresi, supra note 78, at 146-48; see also Guido Calabresi, Ideals,
Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law 97,99-101, 108-14 (1985) (antidiscrimination and Roe);
Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1569, 1618-39 (1979)
(same).
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gously, when a constitutional amendment is passed that permits the
legislature to adopt a statute that it could not previously adopt, the case
law has consistently indicated that-unless the amendment is intended
to be retroactive-a statute that was unconstitutional prior to the
amendment will be enforceable only if it is repassed after the amendment is ratified.l 22 Specifically, in the leading case on point, Newberry v.
United States, 123 the Supreme Court found that a subsequently passed
constitutional amendment would not make a statute that predated the
amendment constitutional because "[a]n after-acquired power can not
ex proprio vigore validate a statute void when enacted." 124 Here, the
same principle would be applied when it is the meaning of the Constitution, rather than one of its component elements, that changes: the
legislature cannot pass a statute that exceeds its powers; if the meaning
of the Constitution changes so that the powers of the legislature expand, legislation once beyond the legislature's scope but now permissible must be repassed to be enforceable.
In the limited context discussed above, the choice of law approach
is based on the idea that the meaning of the Constitution changes as
society changes. Generally, however, the choice of law approach necessarily (if implicitly) rests on the idea that the Constitution means simply
what the judiciary says it means. When the judiciary changes its mind,
122. See, e.g., Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 254 (1921) (Seventeenth
Amendment could not validate section 8 of Federal Corrupt Practices Act, which was
void when enacted); Banaz v. Smith, 65 P. 309, 310 (Ca. 1901) (unless expressly
provided, a state constitutional amendment cannot give life to void provisions in a city
charter); Grayson-Robinson Stores v. Oneida, Ltd., 75 S.E.2d 161, 164 (Ga. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 823 (1953) (citing with approval cases holding that a constitutional
amendment cannot validate a previously enacted statute); Dullam v. Willson, 19 N.W.
112, 114 (Mich. 1884) (a statute that was held unconstitutional and thus void could not
empower the Governor to remove an institute trustee even after the constitution had
been amended lifting the original objection); State ex rei. Rogers v. Swanson, 219
N.W.2d 726, 729 (Neb. 1974) (statute authorizing tuition grants for private school
attendance was invalid when passed and could not be revived by a constitutional
amendment regardless of whether that amendment might authorize such action); see
also NormanJ. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction§ 2.07, at 37 (rev. ed. 1985)
(stating rule). The amendment, however, need not explicitly state that it is to have
retroactive effect, so long as the intent to have such an effect is apparent. For example,
the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, among other reasons, to establish a clear
constitutional basis for the previously enacted Civil Rights Act of 1866. See William E.
Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine 104
(1988) (arguing that section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was added in part for this
purpose); RobertJ. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863, 910 (1986) (observing that
"congressional Republicans . . . acted to incorporate the Civil Rights Act into the
Constitution through the first section of the fourteenth amendment"); see also Akhil R.
Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale LJ. 1193, 1244-46
(1992) (discussing the relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866).
123. 256 u.s. 234 (1921).
124. Id. at 254.
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the meaning of the Constitution changes. The most profound critique
of prospective overruling-Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Desist
v. United States 125 and his dissenting and concurring opinion in Mackey
v. United States 126-was based on the notion that this view ofjudiciallaw
making is illegitimate. 127 This critique is even more compelling in the
125. 394 U.S. 244, 256-69 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan's view
was subsequently endorsed by the Court in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-29
(1987) (citing Justice Harlan's position in Desist).
126. 401 U.S. 667,675-702 (1971) (Harlan,]., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
127. Concern that prospective overruling amounts to judicial law making animates
one part of the current Court and helps explain the Court's inconsistent application of
prospective overruling. For example, this concern played an important role in the
Court's decision in Griffith to overturn Stovall and apply new law retroactively in criminal
cases on direct review. For the liberals on the Court, the result in Griffith was desirable
primarily because the decision guaranteed equal treatment of similarly situated
defendants. Justices Scalia and Powell joined the majority because they equated
prospective overruling with judicial law making. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 58, at
1745.
This concern also helps explain the complicated result in James B. Beam Distilling
Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991). At issue was whether a new rule of law, if it was
applied in the case in which the new rule was announced, had to be applied retroactively
to all other cases. In other words, the case presented the question of whether selective
prospectivity in civil cases was legitimate. The three dissenters-Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy and ChiefJustice Rehnquist-urged the choice of law analysis discussed above
and contended that the fact that the new rule had been applied in the case in which it
was announced did not mean that it had to be applied in all other cases. See id. at 2451
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority held that full retroactivity was necessary, but
did so for a range of reasons. Justices Souter and Stevens found that the need for equal
treatment of similarly situated parties required full retroactivity, but they did not
challenge the legitimacy of full prospectivity. See id. at 2441-48 (Souter, J ., with one
Justice joining the opinion and four Justices concurring in the judgment). (The previous
year Justice Stevens had endorsed prospective overruling as an appropriate
constitutional remedy. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 223
( 1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).) Justice White concurred on the grounds that there was
"no precedent in civil cases [for] applying a new rule to the parties in the case but not to
others similarly situated." james B. Beam Distilling Co., Ill S. Ct. at 2448 (White, J .,
concurring). He specifically stated, however, that courts could prospectively overrule
their precedent, so long as they did not apply the new rule of law to the party in the case
where the new rule was announced. See id. at 2449. Justices Blackmun, Scalia, and
Marshall concurred on the grounds that prospective overruling was always illegitimate
judicial law making. See id. at 2449-50 (Biackmun, J., concurring); id. at 2450-51
(Scalia, J., concurring).
Finally, that concern was present in the majority opinion and in Justice Scalia's
concurrence in Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993), the Court's
most recent confrontation with the prospective overruling question. The Court in
Harper rejected selective prospectivity in civil cases, suggesting that it was a
" 'legislat[ive]' prerogative" to determine that a new rule oflaw should be applied only
prospectively. See id. at 2516 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)).
Indeed, dicta in the majority opinion suggest that a new rule of a federal law must be
applied retroactively. See, e.g., id. at 2516 ("basic norms of constitutional adjudication"
inform rejection of prospectivity in criminal context) (citation omitted); id. at 2517
(absence of "constitutional authority . . . to disregard current law"). But see id. at
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context of prospective overruling when applied to statutes, as opposed
to events. In the statutory context, prospective overruling based on
choice oflaw notions would mean that a judicial decision that the court
subsequently decided to overturn would nonetheless provide a basis
for judicial invalidation of a statute that the legislature had passed in
accordance with its view of the Constitution. Such a result necessarily
implies that the judiciary alone has the power to determine what the
Constitution means. Indeed, it implies that the judiciary's errors can
trump legislative views of the Constitution that the judiciary subsequently determines were correct. Such an expansive view of the judicial role is inconsistent with our constitutional heritage, beginning with
Marbury v. Madison.12s

Viewing prospective overruling as a remedy, however, does not in2527-28 (O'Connor,J., dissenting) (countering implication in majority opinion that it is
improper to give new rule of law only prospective application with citation to cases in
which new rules were given purely prospective effect). Justice Scalia (who, in addition to
filing a concurrence, was one of the five votes making up the majority) similarly
concluded that the decision to make a new rule of law operate only prospectively was
legislative, rather than judicial, in nature. See id. at 2520-24.
The response to this critique is set forth in the text: if prospective overruling is
conceptualized as a remedy, then it does not involve judicial law-making; it involves,
instead, the exercise of a traditional judicial function. See infra notes 129-132 and
accompanying text.
128. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The relevant scholarly literature is vast, but for
leading examples of academic thought expounding on the principle that in our system of
judicial review, beginning with Marbury, the judiciary is not the sole authoritative source
of constitutional interpretation, see, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch 263-64 (1962) (discussing the view that Congress should not enact a bill it
considers unconstitutional); Robert L. Clinton, Marbury u. Madison and Judicial Review
98-99 ( 1989) (arguing that Marbury does not attribute exclusive power to interpret the
Constitution to the Court and does not deny the legislative power to engage in
constitutional interpretation); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 23-42
(2d ed. 1988) (arguing that "a variety of actors" possess the power to interpret the
Constitution); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment
on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 25 n.155 (1964)
(pointing out that Marshall's assertion of judicial authority to interpret the Constitution
in Marbury does not stand for judicial exclusiveness in constitutional interpretation);
Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1008
(1965) (quoting Lincoln's First Inaugural address as an example of the view that the
policy of the government is not determined by the Court's decisions). For examples of
the competing scholarly view, holding that Marbury embodies the position that the
Constitution means what the Court interprets it to mean and nothing more, see, e.g.,
Edmond Cahn, An American Contribution in Supreme Court and Supreme Law 1, 25
(Edmond Cahn ed., 1954) (Marbury begins a "colloquy" between Court and people in
which the Court asserts, "You live under a Constitution but the Constitution is what we
say it is .... "); Benjamin F. Wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Laws 37
(1967) ("[,Harbury• reflects] a theory of the judges as the only true guardians of the
permanent will of the people which is incorporated in the Constitution"). The Supreme
Court opinion which arguably asserts absolute judicial supremacy in constitutional
interpretation is Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I, 18 (1958) (declaring that "the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution"). For a defense of
this approach, see Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper l'.
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vo1ve accepting such a broad judicial role. Seen in this light, prospective overruling does not imply that a statute once held unconstitutional
was in fact unconstitutional, even though the Court subsequently determined that the initial judgment of invalidity was wrong. To support
prospective overruling as a remedy is to make the much lesser claim
that, when a court changes its mind about a rule of constitutional law, it
can take the steps needed to protect those who relied on its initial
determination.
Conceiving of prospective overruling as a remedy is hardly novel.
Writing for four dissenters in American Trucking, Justice Stevens proposed treating prospective overruling as part of the law of remedies
designed to protect reliance. 129 The idea can be traced back to Justice
Harlan, 130 and it has recently been convincingly argued for by Professors Fallon and Meltzer.I3I
When viewed as a remedy, the technique of prospective overruling
is concerned with the consequences that should follow from the relative
unpredictability of a judicial decision that overturns a previous judicial
decision. 132 With respect to statutes, one problem associated with relative unpredictability is political reliance. Political actors allocate their
political capital based on the assumption that the initial judicial decision is unlikely to be overturned. If political reliance with respect to a
specific statute is sufficiently compelling to justify shaping a judicial
remedy, only one remedy appears adequate: denying enforcement of
the previously unconstitutional statute unless it is repassed. No other
remedy will avoid seriously disadvantaging those who relied on the initial invalidating decision.
But should courts be able to engage in selective prospectivity?
That is, if a court in the overruling decision evaluates a statute under
the rule of law announced in that decision, must all other statutes be
evaluated using that new rule of law-or can the old rule of law be
applied in other cases? 133 These questions appear particularly significant in the wake of Casey, since the Court there applied the new rule of
law to the Pennsylvania statute at issue in the case. Thus, if there is no
selective prospective overruling in the statutory context, the rule of law
enunciated in Casey, having been applied to one statute, is applicable to
all other statutes on the books.
Although the Supreme Court once sanctioned selective prospectivAaron Revisited, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 387, 403-ll. But see Tribe, supra, at 35 (arguing
that Cooper need not be read as embodying such a broad assertion of judicial authority).
129. See 496 U.S. at 221-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. See United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286,296-97 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring); see also 496 U.S. at 223-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing concurring
opinion of Justice Harlan in Estate of Donnell)' as support for view of prospective
overruling as remedy).
131. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 58, at 1758-77.
132. See id. at 1768.
133. For further discussion of this doctrine, see supra note 127.
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ity in criminal cases, 134 more recently, it has rejected this doctrine, finding that it violates the principle of treating like cases alike. 135 The
Court has never applied selective prospectivity in the civil context, and
in the recent case of Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 136 it specifically rejected the doctrine. There appears to be a two-fold rationale for
that decision. First, the Court in Harper suggested that only legislatures
properly have the freedom "to make rules of law retroactive or prospective as [they] see fit"; 137 the nature of the judicial function requires
retroactive application of new rules. 138 Second, " 'selective application
of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated [parties]
the same.' " 139
But if prospective overruling is viewed as remedial, the court that
adopts it is not, in fact, usurping legislative functions; it is merely deciding, as is consistent with judicial practice in a range of other contexts,
to fashion a remedy capable of protecting those who have relied on its
decisions. Moreover, the risk of treating similar cases disparately does
not arise when prospective overruling is applied to statutes. Similarly
situated litigants will receive the same treatment so long as the application of a particular statute is consistent. 14 0
134. See Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1975); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 296-301 (1967);johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 726-35 (1966).
135. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 327-28 (1987) ("actual inequity ...
results when only one of many similarly situated defendants receives the benefit of the
new rule" (citation omitted)).
136. 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993).
137. Id. at 2516.
138. This argument suggests that a rule of pure prospectivity would also be
illegitimate. See supra note 127.
139. 113 S. Ct. at 2516 (quoting Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323).
140. In addition, the reliance interest will vary from statute to statute and thus it is
appropriate to treat some litigants differently from others. For example, as will be
subsequently discussed (see infra part II.D), the reliance interest for a post-Webster
abortion statute would not be the same as with a pre-Webster statute. Courts thus should
have the ability to apply the new rule oflaw to some, but not all, statutes passed prior to
its announcement. This would not violate the principle of treating similarly situated
things alike since from the relevant perspective-that of the degree of reliance-not all
statutes are similarly situated. Thus, the better view is that the fact that the statute in
Casey is now enforceable should not mean that other abortion regulation statutes that
satisfy the Casey test will be enforceable without being repassed. Moreover, if courts
were to adopt the doctrine of prospective overruling in the statutory context, there
would be a particularly compelling case for not holding that failure to apply that
doctrine in Casey would bar application of this technique to other abortion statutes. Not
only was the technique not considered in Casey, the technique had not even been
advanced as a theory at that time. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Court
did not make a considered choice not to overrule the statute prospectively. Thus, the
Casey situation is different from that in Harper. The Court in the overruling decision that
preceded Harper, Davis v. Michigan Dep't of the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), had
available to it the doctrine of prospective overruling and elected not to apply it. See
Harper, 113 S. Ct. at 2513-16 (discussing Davis).
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Determining When to Overrule Statutes Prospectively

Expanding the doctrine of prospective overruling would not require judging all statutes passed prior to the judiciary's promulgation
of a new rule by the old rule. The Chevron Oil test-which the Court has
enunciated as its guide in determining when prospective overruling is
called for 141 -remains an appropriate guide as the doctrine of prospective overruling is extended to the statutory context. Because of the
political reliance problem, in evaluating statutes, the critical prong of
the Chevron Oil test is the third one: "[w]here a decision of this Court
could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively,
there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship'
by a holding of nonretroactivity." 142 Whether "injustice or hardship"
mandate prospective application will turn on a fact-specific inquiry; we
propose that this inquiry take into account three factors.
The first factor to be considered is the amount of time that elapsed
between the invalidating decision and the overruling decision. The
greater the passage of time, the more likely it is that political actors
have relied on the finality of the judicial decision. For example, the
case for political reliance is particularly compelling with respect to the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 since more than one hundred years have
passed since the Act was invalidated. In contrast, if the Supreme Court
overturns a statute and then reverses itself the following month, the
case for political reliance is unpersuasive. Hepburn 143 and the Legal
Tender Cases 144 exemplify this situation. Hepburn was decided on
February 7, 1870; on March 25, 1870, the Attorney General asked the
Court to hear another legal tender case in order to reconsider its decision; on April 1, 1870, the Court acceded to that request, agreeing to
hear the Legal Tender Cases } 4 5
The second factor to be considered concerns the extent to which it
was clear that the statute at issue was unconstitutional under the invalidating decision. If the statute at issue was the statute involved in the
invalidating decision, then the answer is obvious. For example, Roe
concerned Texas's criminal abortion statute; there could be no question that that statute was unconstitutional under the rule of law enunciated in Roe-since that was the express holding of the Court. 146 It can
also be clear, however, that statutes other than those explicitly and directly at issue in the invalidating decision were unconstitutional under
141. See supra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
142. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971) (citations omitted).
143. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870). See discussion supra
notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
144. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). See discussion supra
notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
145. See Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme
Court and the Legal Tender Cases (Installment 2), 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1128, 1128 (1941).
146. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
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the rule of law that decision established. For example, it is apparent
that, under the rule established in Roe, statutes that criminalize any
abortion except an abortion to save the mother's life are unconstitutional. Roe says as much. 147 In contrast, the more the invalidating decision is ambiguous or its contours unclear, the less the equities favor
political actors who assumed that the statute was unconstitutional.
The third factor is the relative timing of the statute's passage and
the relevant judicial decisions. As previously discussed, an invalidating
decision skews the political dynamic. A statute passed prior to the invalidating decision may not be repealed after that decision despite the fact
that it no longer has majoritarian support. Similarly, a statute may be
passed after the invalidating decision even though it does not enjoy
majoritarian support. When a court, however, signals that it is reconsidering an invalidating decision, then the political process is no longer
skewed: political actors know, or should know, that a statute they
pass-even though invalid under current case law-may be upheld. In
such circumstances, political reliance is unlikely to exist, and, if it does
exist, should not be rewarded. To take a concrete example: Webster
altered the relevant political context, for five members of the Court arguably signalled (albeit in different ways) that Roe was in danger of being overruled.l 48 Webster, therefore, placed political actors on notice
that they could not rely on Roe. Political developments reflected the
change in judicial climate: as previously noted, after Webster, the
number of state legislative bodies that supported keeping abortion
legal rose from twenty-three to fifty . 149
This analysis suggests the following typology. Let us call Adams the
invalidating decision; Baker the decision that signals that a court is reconsidering Adams; Cobb the decision that overrules Adams. The third
factor that we have identified as relevant to the determination of
whether there has been political reliance meriting protection would
counsel that, after Cobb, statutes inconsistent with the rule in Adams and
which were passed prior to Adams would have to be repassed to be enforceable. The same is true of statutes passed between Adams and
Baker. But post-Baker and pre-Cobb statutes would not have to be repassed to be enforceable. Prospective overruling would thus effectively
serve to protect political reliance, ensuring that those who take judicial
decisions seriously and structure their political activities in accordance
147. "A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from
criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to
pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
148. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989) (threemember plurality opinion); id. at 525-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 532 (Scalia,
]., concurring).
149. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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with such decisions will not be harmed when a court alters its constitutional interpretation.
III.

CURRENT MAJORITIES

Part II of this Article argued that prospective overruling is appropriate in certain circumstances in which political reliance on an invalidating decision has skewed the operation of majoritarian decisionmaking processes. This Part presents a second theoretical justification
for the doctrine of prospective overruling of statutes, and a second category of cases in which use of the doctrine is appropriate. Our argument here draws on the insights of Alexander Bickel in his Harvard
Foreword, The Passive Virtues. In that essay, Bickel highlighted the fact
that a statute may remain on the books even if it does not enjoy the
support of a current majority, and he argued that courts should use
technical devices to force current majoritarian consideration of constitutionally problematic statutes. Our first subpart develops both
Bickel's ideas and the principal criticisms leveled against the Bickelian
approach. Our second subpart applies Bickel's ideas to the revival debate. We argue that prospective overruling lacks the weaknesses of the
judicial tools that Bickel urged courts to apply. More importantly,
Bickel's arguments make it clear that there is one class of statutes for
which prospective overruling is particularly appropriate: statutes that
affect individual liberty. If a statute is found unconstitutional on the
grounds that it violates individual liberty (or if it is unconstitutional
under a rule of law enunciated in decisions concerning liberty interests), it clearly affects constitutionally protected liberty interests, even
though a subsequent judicial decision may establish a new rule of law
under which the statute's affect on liberty interests would no longer be
held to rise to the level of unconstitutionality. The importance our
constitutional system attaches to the protection of individual liberty indicates that such a statute should be enforceable only if a current majority, made aware of the relevant constitutional concerns by both the
invalidating decision and the overruling decision, reaffirms its desire
for that statute.
A.

The Past Majoritarian Dilemma and Bickel

In both our national and state systems, in order to be adopted legislation must go through a process that ensures that it has majoritarian,
if not supermajoritarian, support. Thus, in the federal government
(and most of the states), to become law the proposed statute must navigate a committee structure that has the capacity to prevent its further
consideration; it must secure passage by both legislative houses; and, in
the event of an executive veto, it must garner enough support to override the veto. 150
150. This is not to say that a particular bill will always be favored by a majority. A
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But once a statute is on the books, the "burden of inertia," 151 to
use Guido Calabresi's phrase, is on its side. A combination of thirtyfour percent of one house of the legislature and the executive is obviously sufficient to keep the statute on the books, even if it lacks current
majoritarian support. Indeed, the committee system is such that a far
weaker coalition can block repeal. And so a "revived" abortion statute,
for example, may remain in force despite current majoritarian
desires .I 5 2
Yet the commitment of our system of government to majority rule
raises the question: Why should the starting point of legislation reflect
the beliefs of past, rather than current, majorities? There are, of
course, reasons why, in the normal course of affairs, legislation does
not automatically expire. Legislative energy is a scarce resource whose
consequences should not be lightly cast aside.l 53 Moreover, the incentives to pass legislation would be radically undercut if all legislation
were temporary, and proposed legislation would not receive the attention it requires. But perhaps most important, with the ordinary statute,
its ongoing enforcement, combined with the fact that it has not been
repealed, indicates that it has continuously enjoyed some level of support. At no point has the majority decided that the statute is both of
such significance and so erroneous or counterproductive as to warrant
the expenditure of efforts necessary to repeal it.
The issue of the extent to which old majorities should be able to
establish the starting point for current deliberations has been one that
Americans have debated since at least the time of the ratification debates over the Constitution. Anti-federalists, for example, opposed the
Constitution in part on the grounds that its flexibility and purported
ability to adapt to the future was a weakness, not a strength. They
claimed that the dead hand control that the Constitution represented
would unfairly burden future generations; better to have a time-bound
constitution that would be repealed, rather than one that sought to
constrain governmental decision-making for all time} 54 Even propocoalition can be formed in support of a statute comprising both those who actually favor
it and those who are willing to endorse it in exchange for support on other matters from
the statute's actual proponents. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and
Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo. LJ. 281, 308-09 nn.140-41 (1989); see also Akhil R.
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1043, 1083-85 (1988) (less representative Senate can exploit leverage to secure
House support for statute).
151. Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 164 (1982).
152. This is equally true whether the current majority desires a statute that is more
restrictive (assuming it is still within constitutional bounds) or less restrictive than the
revived statute.
153. See Hutchinson & Morgan, supra note 64, at 1765 (discussing scarcity of
legislative time and consequences of that scarcity).
154. See Michael Lienesch, New Order of the Ages: Time, The Constitution, and
the Making of Modem American Political Thought 148-50 (1988) (discussing anti-
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nents of the Constitution were concerned about this issue. Thus,
Thomas Jefferson wrote James Madison:
[N]o society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation.
They may manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they
please, during their usufruct. They are masters too of their
own persons, and consequently may govern them as they
please. But persons and property make the sum of the objects
of government. The constitution and the laws of their predecessors extinguished then in their natural course with those
who gave them being. This could preserve that being till it
ceased to be itself, and no longer. Every constitution then,
and every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be
enforced longer, it is an act of force, and not of right. 155
Such concerns reemerged in modern legal scholarship through the
work of Alexander Bickel, and in particular his Harvard Foreword, The
Passive Virtues. 156 The Passive Virtues reflects Bickel's belief that, as a general matter, current majorities have a superior claim to authority in a
democracy than past majorities. The Passive Virtues also advances the
related argument that, in constitutional gray areas courts should promote informed current majoritarian decision-making by forcing considered majoritarian reevaluation of legislation, rather than simply
holding it unconstitutional.157
The section of The Passive Virtues of greatest relevance to the revival
debate is Bickel's discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Poe v.
Ullman. 158 At issue in Poe was the constitutionality of Connecticut's
birth control statute, which made it a misdemeanor for a person to use
"any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. " 159 Those who sold or distributed birth control devices could be punished as accessories to a crime. 160
The birth control statute had been passed in 1879. 161 In the more
than three-quarters of a century between the time of the Act's passage
federalist concern that a constitution articulated in broad and flexible language would
invite oppression).
155. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 392, 395-96 (Julian Boyd ed., 1958). For a recent
intellectual history of this letter, see Herbert Sloan, "The Earth Belongs in Usufruct to
the Living," in Jeffersonian Legacies 281 (PeterS. Onuf ed., 1993).
156. See Bickel, supra note 22.
157. Bickel's principal works are: The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); The
Morality of Consent (1975); Politics and the Warren Court (1965); The Supreme Court
and the Idea of Progress (1970); The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The
Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961); and, with Harry H. Wellington, Legislative
Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Harv. L. Rev. I (1957).
158. 367 u.s. 497 (1961).
159. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-32 ( 1958).
160. See id. § 54-196.
161. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 61 & n.98.
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and the Supreme Court's consideration of it, practically no one similarly situated to appellants-two women whose lives would be endangered by child bearing, the husband of one of the two women, and the
doctor who wished to advise them on birth control-had been prosecuted under the statute. 162
In Bickel's view, the lack of enforcement suggested that the bill no
longer had current majoritarian support. "The influences that favor
the objective of the statute cannot summon sufficient political
strength-or perhaps they have not the desire-to cause it to be enforced; assuming that the consistent enforcement of a law is as much a
function of the political process as is enactment of it." 163 Nonenforcement was relevant to Bickel because it suggested that relatively little
weight should be given to the fact that there had not been repeal. He
wrote:
It would be foolish, of course, and it would ensure paralysis, to
expect continual expression of the legislative will through continual reconsideration of the statutebook. But normal law enforcement indicates the continuity of will, because it conduces
to legislative reconsideration when the dominant opinion
turns-although greater strength must be mobilized to repeal
a statute than to resist its enactment. When the law is consistently not enforced, the chance of mustering opposition sufficient to move the legislature is reduced to the vanishing
point.164
At the same time, the pro-birth control forces had not been able to
achieve the end they desired: "The influences which oppose the law
cannot summon sufficient political strength to cause it to be repealed;
attempts have been made from 1923 onward, and they have failed." 165
"[T]he statute does not speak the present will of dominant forces in the
state," Bickel wrote, "[i]t represents at present a deadlock of wills, from
which the Court was asked to extricate the state." 166
The Court in Poe dismissed the case. Justice Frankfurter's plurality
opinion found the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. 167 In support of
this conclusion, Frankfurter stressed the prudential aspect of the
Supreme Court's standing doctrine, 168 and noted that "[t]he undeviating policy of nullification by Connecticut of its anti-contraceptive laws
throughout all the long years that they have been on the statute books
bespeaks more than prosecutorial paralysis." 169
Bickel interpreted the case, and in particular Frankfurter's refer162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See id. at 59-61.
Id. at 60 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 63.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1961) (plurality opinion).
See id. at 503.
Id. at 502.
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ences to nonenforcement, as standing for the proposition that had the
appellants in the case been prosecuted, as opposed to seeking a declaratory judgment, the Supreme Court would have held that the prosecution "would fail on the grounds of desuetude." 170 Desuetude (as
conceptualized by Bickel) stood for the proposition that "a statute that
has never been enforced and that has not been obeyed for threequarters of a century may [not] suddenly be resurrected and applied."171 The doctrine was appropriate because "[t]he unenforced
statute is not, in the normal way, a continuing reflection of the balance
of political pressures. When it is resurrected and enforced, it represents the ad hoc decision of the prosecutor, unrelated to anything that
may realistically be taken as present legislative policy." 172
Poe did not stand for the proposition that Connecticut's birth control statute was unconstitutional, nor did it stand for the proposition
that the statute was constitutional. Rather, it stood for the proposition
that, before the Court would rule on the statute's constitutional merits,
it wanted a considered judgment by a contemporary legislature that the
statute should be enforced. As Bickel put it:
The Court in the Birth Control Cases engaged in a sort of colloquy with the political institutions, begun by way of questions
and answers at the [oral] argument, stylized and brought to a
Socratic conclusion in the prevailing opinion. The upshot was
the framing of conditions to invite a responsible legislative
decision. 173
More broadly, Bickel argued that courts should not be forced to
choose between invalidating and upholding statutes. 174 Seeking a middle ground that permitted courts to engage in constitutional education
without unnecessarily weakening majoritarian power, he argued that
they should instead exploit various procedural devices to highlight for
the legislature particular acts that were in constitutional gray areas. In
addition to desuetude, Bickel suggested that the doctrines of delegation of powers, ripeness, standing, and void for vagueness could be
used to this end.
Bickel's The Passive Virtues essay in general, as well as his use of the
doctrine of desuetude, has evoked passionate criticism, with the most
telling critique offered by Professor Gerald Gunther. 175 Gunther attacked Bickel's reading of Poe, describing his use of the doctrine of desuetude as "novel and tenuous." 176 Gunther also attacked Bickel for
170. Bickel, supra note 22, at 64.
171. ld. at 62.
172. Id. at 63.
173. ld. at 64.
174. This view has come to be known as the passive virtues doctrine.
175. See Gunther, supra note 128.
176. Id. at 20. For more detailed critiques of Bickel's desuetude argument, see
Linda Rogers & William Rogers, Desuetude as a Defense, 52 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 2-29
(1966) (rejecting doctrine of desuetude); Mark P. Henriques, Note, Desuetude and
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urging the Court to exploit technical devices to avoid deciding difficult
questions of constitutional law. Employing particularly memorable
phrasing, Gunther observed: "There indeed lies the novelty and vulnerability of the Bickel thesis: the emphasis on principle as the highest
Court duty, but only in a limited sphere of Court actions; the 100%
insistence on principle, 20% of the time." 177
According to Gunther, the avoidance techniques that Bickel discussed in his article had precedentially established meanings. Bickel,
however, was redefining them in order to give the Court the freedom to
decide the constitutional cases it wanted to decide, and the ability to
force legislative reconsideration when it thought that approach appropriate.178 Thus, while Bickel claimed to be an advocate of judicial restraint, he had developed an approach to constitutional law that would
result in a "virulent variety of free-wheeling interventionism." 179
Despite criticisms such as Gunther's, Bickel's vision has had a
broad appeal for legal scholars. The notion of judicial review as constitutional dialogue-which can be found in the work of such scholars as
Louis Fisher, 180 Harry Wellington, 181 Henry Monaghan, 182 Terrance
Declaratory Judgment: A New Challenge to Obsolete Laws, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1057, 1075
(1990) (arguing that Bickel's reading of Poe was "strained" and that the doctrine of
desuetude should not be exploited by courts to avoid constitutional questions). On the
other hand, the West Virginia Supreme Court has recently read Poe much as Bickel did
and invoked it in support of its use of desuetude to bar a criminal prosecution. See
Committee on Legal Ethics v. Printz, 416 S.E.2d 720, 726-27 (W.Va. 1992) (describing
desuetude as a widely accepted-if seldom applied-legal concept based on notions of
fairness embodied in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses). We are indebted
to Professor Joseph Perillo for this reference.
177. Gunther, supra note 128, at 3.
178. See id. at 9-25; see also Calabresi, supra note 121, at 16-21 (advancing a
similar criticism of Bickel).
179. Gunther, supra note 128, at 25.
180. See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process
3-6, 85-118 (1988) (advancing the theory that the three branches of government
interact in an ongoing colloquy over constitutional law).
181. See Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 Yale L.J. 221, 265-311 ( 1973) (examining
the allocation of responsibility for constitutional law making between the legislative and
judicial branches); Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 Yale LJ.
486, 504-20 (1982) (examining the effect of judicial review on the more majoritarian
branches' tendency to articulate their goals precisely and clearly); Harry H. Wellington,
Book Review, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 326, 333-35 (1983) (reviewing Michael]. Perry, The
Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights ( 1982) (urging legislative-judicial dialogue
on constitutional questions)).
182. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 26-30 (1975) (suggesting that the
creation of a federal common law regarding civil liberties provides the Court with a
means for "involving the Congress in a continuing process of defining the context and
consequences of individual liberties" thereby instituting a dialogue between the Court
and the Congress).
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Sandalow, 183 and Paul Dimond 184-ultimately rests on the Bickelian
premise that a primary role of courts in constitutional adjudication is to
force legislatures to focus on the constitutional consequences of their
acts. As Dimond has explained the concept of constitutional dialogue:
[T]he Court itself may choose to invoke a variety of devices ...
to kick a particular policy issue back to the legislature for reconsideration. Such judicial actions merely operate as suspensive vetoes and invite the people's elected representatives to
reconsider the issue again and legislate more carefully and directly on the subject matter if they so choose ....
The Court's rulings may take the form of final interpretations and at any point appear to be forever binding. Over
time, however, they can be better understood as positing a
provisional meaning, which will be followed, supplemented,
expanded, eroded, distinguished, ignored, or reversed as the
people and future Courts respond. 1 8 5
Bickel's concern with vindicating current majorities has received its
greatest elaboration in Guido Calabresi's A Common Law for the Age of
Statutes, where it is applied outside of the constitutional context.
Calabresi started from the premise that American society was "choking
on obsolete statutes." 186 Because of societal change, and in particular
because of the development of the regulatory state, this country had
witnessed an" 'orgy of statute making.' " 187 The common law had permitted courts to update the law to reflect societal and legal change. But
statutory law had no such capacity for judicial updating. The legislative
process was subject to what Calabresi called a "retentionist bias," 188
which prevented legislative repeal or revision, even as majoritarian support for legislation disappeared.
According to Calabresi, the need for change was not being met.
"Although abrupt or frequent changes are often not desirable," he
wrote, "laws must change to meet the needs of changing times and, in
democratic systems, the demands of changing majorities or, perhaps
more accurately, of changing coalitions of minorities." 189 This was not
183. See Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 Mich. L. Rev.
1162, 1187-90 (1977) (By exercising constitutional review, courts "help ensure that the
effective delegations of power required in a complex society do not lead to
governmental action that departs from the society's fundamental values.").
184. See Paul R. Dimond, The Supreme Court and Judicial Choice: The Role of
Provisional Review in a Democracy 11-20, 153-56 (1989); Paul R. Dimond, Common
Sense About an Uncommon Rejection, 15 Law & Soc. Inquiry 767, 798 (1990)
[hereinafter Dimond, Common Sense] (reviewing Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of
America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990) & Ethan Bronner, Battle for Justice:
How the Bork Nomination Shook America (1989)).
185. Dimond, Common Sense, supra note 184, at 798 (footnotes omitted).
186. Calabresi, supra note 151, at 169.
187. Id. at 1 (quoting Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 95 (1977)).
188. Id. at 149, 164.
189. Id. at 3.

1948

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1902

happening. "[B]ecause a statute is hard to revise once it is passed, laws
are governing us that would not and could not be enacted today, and
... some of these laws not only could not be reenacted but also do not
fit, are in some sense inconsistent with, our whole legallandscape." 190
Some remedy was needed: "To let the statute stand is frequently to
perpetuate the will of a majority that no longer exists." 191
Calabresi proposed that courts take on the function of reviewing
statutes, just as they reviewed common law precedent, to determine if
they fit the "legal topography." 19 2 "What, then, is the common law
function to be exercised by courts today?" he asked himself. He
answered:
It is no more and no less than the critical task of deciding when a retentionist or a revisionist bias is appropriately applied to an existing statutory or common law rule. It is the judgmental function . . . of
deciding when a rule has come to be sufficiently out of phase
with the whole legal framework so that, whatever its age, it can
only stand if a current majoritarian or representative body reaffirms it. It is to be the allocator of that burden of inertia
which our system of separation of powers and checks and balances mandates. It is to assign the task of overcoming inertia
to that interest, whose desires do not conform with the fabric
of the law, and hence whose wishes can only be recognized if
current and clear majoritarian support exists for them. 193
Calabresi's theory has been generously praised, and it has at the
same time sparked significant criticism. It has been suggested that
there may well be too few "obsolescent" statutes to warrant concern. 194
Judicial assumption of this new function without explicit congressional
authorization has been attacked as lacking in legitimacy, 195 and it has
been contended that Calabresi's system is unworkable. 196 None of
these criticisms touches on Calabresi's central insight-which was also
Bickel's: In a democracy, rules established by a current majority have a
better claim to legitimacy than rules established by an old majority.
Another criticism of Calabresi, however, deserves to be noted because it, unlike the others, applies to Bickel as well and should be considered in determining whether the Bickelian approach should be
followed in the revival context. Critics charge Calabresi with failing to
190. Id. at 2.
191. Id. at 109.
192. Id. at 18.
193. ld. at 164.
194. See Frank M. Coffin, The Problem of Obsolete Statutes: A New Role for
Courts?, 91 Yale L.J. 827, 836 (1982) (reviewing Calabresi, supra note 151).
195. See Samuel Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi's Uncommon
Law for a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1126, 1136 (1982) (reviewing Calabresi,
supra note 151).
196. See Coffin, supra note 194, at 838-39.
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acknowledge the importance of continuity in our governmental system.
As Professor Farber wrote:
Our legislative process is designed so that laws will outlive the
political coalitions that enact them. It is not at all clear that a
democratic system could function otherwise. What is clear is
that pure majoritarianism has never been our system of government. It is a basic institutional requirement of our system
of government that the legitimacy of a statute be independent
of the current state of public opinion. 19 '
It is thus argued that Calabresi fails to accord adequate weight to the
importance of inertia in our governmental system. "Without these constraints and constructs [that promote legislative inertia], legislatures
would be plagued by instability and would be unable to function as deliberative bodies," 198 Farber wrote, and then added, "This is one of
the fundamental insights of modern public choice theory." 199
In the next section, we will apply the Bickelian insights to the revival question and make the argument for nonrevival. We will also explain why the criticisms that have been leveled against Bickel's
approach are irrelevant to our proposed solution of prospective
overruling.
B.

Revival and Current Majoritarianism

Bickel suggests that our primary concern should be with the decisions made by current legislators, rather than with the decisions made
by those in the past. As a general matter, according to the Bickelian
view, if legislators today fail to pass any legislation in an area of constitutional significance, then there should not be any legislation in that
area in force. A strong form of this view would suggest that any legislation should expire after a relatively brief period of time. Bickel, however, stops short of this position. He argues that most statutes, because
they are enforced, are subject to something akin to ongoing
majoritarian review; the fact that the enforcement of a statute does not
lead to its repeal suggests that the statute has a significant amount of
support. It is only in the case of the unenforced statute that the judiciary should take steps to force legislative reconsideration.
It should be recognized that implicit in Bickel's argument is a bias
against regulation. This bias, although somewhat obscured by his
stress on current majoritarian decision-making, is a necessary premise
of his argument. When legislative forces are deadlocked in a matter
197. Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo.
LJ. 281, 308-09 (1989).
198. Id. at 308.
199. Id. at 308 n.140. For examples of works in public choice theory that stress the
significance of stability in the legislative process, see William H. Riker, Liberalism
Against Populism 169-95 (1982); Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, Legislative
Intent and Public Choice, 74 Va. L. Rev. 423, 425-35 (1988).
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that raises constitutional concerns (without necessarily violating the
Constitution), Bickel assumes that the appropriate legal response is to
employ a default rule under which no law is in effect. Yet, if one
presumes deadlock, one also presumes that neither the forces in favor
of the old law nor those in favor of repealing the old law have the necessary support to shift the legal position from the position they oppose
to the one that they desire. (Thus, the proponents of the statute could
not secure its passage, if it were not on the books; its opponents could
not secure its repeal, if it were already on the books). Neither enforcement or nonenforcement, then, can appropriately be considered the result of current majoritarian decision-making. Bickel's bias against
regulation breaks the deadlock.
When the statute at issue imposes restraints on individual libertyeven if those restraints are not unconstitutional-Bickel's argument accords with the most fundamental tenets of constitutional governance.
As the framers repeatedly made clear in the ratification debates, our
federal government is one of limited powers. Those powers that the
people did not delegate, they retained. It was precisely for this reason
that many argued that a Bill of Rights was not necessary: in enacting
the Constitution, the people were not delegating the power to encroach
on individual liberty. Thus, Hamilton argued in Federalist 84 that bills
of rights "according to their primitive signification ... have no application to constitutions, professedly founded upon the power of the people and executed by their immediate representatives and servants.
Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain
everything they have no need of particular reservations." 200
Coupled with the libertarian bias of our constitutional system, this
suggests that if a statute diminishes individual liberty it should be enforceable only if it is desired by a current majority. In this context,
then, Bickel's default rule of no regulation makes sense. But when a
challenged statute implicates other areas of constitutional governance
the argument loses its cogency. Other than the political reliance concerns previously discussed and the individual reliance interests that the
law has traditionally recognized, there is, for example, no obvious reason why with respect to a statute that is problematic on, say, separation
of powers grounds, a default position of no statute is preferable to the
default position established by the old statute.
Nonrevival of statutes implicating individual liberty directly follows
from the Bickelian premises identified above. A statute that has been at
one point at odds with governing decisions of constitutional law concerned with the protection of individual liberty interests should be enforceable only if it is desired by a current majority that has been
200. The Federalist No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.
1961). For the similar arguments of other Federalists, see Gordon S. Wood, The
Creation of the American Republic: 1776-1787, at 539-41 (1969).
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informed by judicial decisions of the relevant constitutional
parameters.
The Bickelian case for nonrevival is strongest when the statute has
long been unenforced because of a judicial decision that held the statute unconstitutional or that announced a rule of law under which the
statute was unconstitutional. Because of this passage of time, the parallel between such a fact pattern and that in Poe is strong. The primary
factual difference between the two situations is the reason for nonenforcement, and that difference makes the case for nonrevival stronger
than the case for passive virtues. With respect to the birth control statute in Poe, nonenforcement both manifested and contributed to political deadlock; deadlock was very clearly not the result of some prior
judicial action. In the nonrevival context, however, for reasons
presented in our discussion of political reliance, the initialjudicial decision of unconstitutionality altered the majoritarian decision-making
process in a way that diminished the likelihood of repeal. In other
words, in Poe, the fact that the statute had not been repealed indicated
deadlock; in a case in which a statute has been held unconstitutional,
failure to repeal may not mean deadlock. In the nonrevival context,
then, there is much less reason to find in the decisions of past majorities a surrogate for what a current majority would do, and there is
therefore less reason to allow the decision of a past majority to establish the starting point for majoritarian decision-making. This argument
concerning the appropriate starting point is particularly compelling
when the past majority bears little resemblance to the current
majority.2° 1
The argument for nonrevival, however, is strong, even when the
overruling decision follows shortly after the initial determination of unconstitutionality. For Bickel, the passive virtues represented devices
that courts could use to force legislative reconsideration of statutes that
they believed were problematic, but that they were unwilling to pronounce unconstitutional at that time. In the nonrevival situation, a majority of the court (although a past majority) once believed that the
statute was not just problematic, but that it was unconstitutional. If
courts and legislatures are to engage in constitutional dialogue, this is a
situation in which it is particularly important for them to do so. Both
the court decision holding a statute unconstitutional and the decision
reversing the decision illuminate the constitutional concerns in an area.
In other words, they apprise the legislature of what constitutional concerns are implicated by a statute. Only if the legislature knows of these
concerns is it a fully informed constitutional actor, and only then
should its actions be enforceable. Thus, Bickel's insights suggest that
revival should never occur. Any statute that has been judicially invali201. The 1855 statute at issue in Weeks makes this point dramatically, since the
electorate that selected the legislature that passed that statute excluded women and
African-Americans.
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dated is thereby unenforceable for all time, although a second judicial
decision reversing the first decision empowers the legislature to pass a
statute identical to the one initially invalidated.
Bickel's work, therefore, suggests a second argument for extension
of the doctrine of prospective overruling to the statutory context: prospective overruling is a device that courts can employ to remand to the
legislature statutes that implicate individual liberty interests. 202 In this
view, the need to remand a statute justifies application of the technique
of prospective overruling regardless of whether the case is one in which
there has been political reliance.
The nature of the technique of prospective overruling establishes
limits as to its uses. Prospective overruling does not permit a court to
remand all constitutionally problematic statutes. It permits a court to
remand only those statutes that are inconsistent with prior governing
decisions of constitutionallaw.2°3
202. There may be instances in which there is a dispute about whether a statute
implicates protected liberty interests. Assume, for example, a situation in which the
invalidating decision concludes that a statute violates the right to privacy and the
overruling decision finds that the Constitution does not protect a right to privacy.
Supporters of the overruling decision might thus argue that the statute is not only
constitutional, but that it does not even burden a cognizable liberty interest.
Nonetheless, under the test set forth in this part, such a statute would not be revived
because that statute was at one time inconsistent with governing case laws and because
that case law was concerned with the protection of individual liberty interests. Such a
result is appropriate for two reasons. First, the invalidating decision means that there
has been significant support for the position that the statute is unconstitutional; such
support weighs in favor of the result that the statute should be enforceable only if
desired by a current majority. Second, the bright-line test used here sufficiently limits
courts so they will be constrained in terms of which statutes they can force the
legislature to reconsider; in other words, nonrevival in this limited category of cases
(i.e., ones in which the overruling decision fails to recognize that a liberty interest is
implicated) is consistent with our view that courts should be subject to significant
constraints in their use of the technique of prospective overruling of statutes.
203. The way in which we are using Bickel's and Calabresi's work here should thus
be contrasted with their previous invocation in the context of arguments against revival
of abortion statutes. We are not simply suggesting that courts should simply be able to
remand constitutionally problematic statutes for reconsideration. See NARAL Brief,
supra note 58, at 31 n.28 (invoking Calabresi, Bickel, and others in support of notion of
remanding). We are, rather, suggesting that concerns that these authors identified
warrant the creation of a new judicial technique which will have a limited range of
applications.
We are also not arguing for the use of desuetude or for that of a Calabresian second
look doctrine. See Scott, supra note 58, at 381-88. As previously discussed, see supra
notes 175-179, 194-199 and accompanying text, these techniques have been subject to
telling criticism. Moreover, they do not address the problems associated with revival. A
constitutionally problematic statute can still be consistent with the legal topography;
thus, the Calabresian second look doctrine cannot force remanding in many situations in
which it would be appropriate. Similarly, the doctrine of desuetude is inapplicable if the
statute is recent or if, despite the fact that it is inconsistent with governing decisions of
constitutional law, it has been consistently enforced (like the Washington State statute at
issue in II'est Coast Hotel, see supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text).
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As has been pointed out, Bickel's passive virtues have been subject
to substantial criticisms. But nonrevival of statutes through the use of
the technique of prospective overruling-while it accords with Bickel's
insights-is not subject to these criticisms.
Gunther correctly observed that, as Bickel championed the various
passive virtues judicial techniques, he also altered their substance, and
he did so without establishing principled limits to their use. Because
Bickel redefined the passive virtues techniques in a way that left them
unconstrained by precedential limits, he gave courts almost complete
freedom to decide to force reconsideration of statutes.
Prospective overruling in the statutory context is, in contrast, a
technique of limited application. It is of use only for a relatively small
category of cases: those in which a finding of unconstitutionality is reversed. Prospective overruling in the statutory context, then, unlike
Bickel's passive virtues, would not allow courts to provoke reconsideration of any statute that they found constitutionally troublesome. Indeed, with respect to prospective overruling, the question is not
whether there is substantial support for the position that a particular
statute is unconstitutional. Rather, prospective overruling in this context uses a simple bright line test: Is this statute one that was at one
time inconsistent with governing case law, and was that case law based
on protection of individual liberty interests?204
The other principal critique of current majoritarianism is the public choice critique that Farber advanced against Calabresi, but that is
equally applicable to Bickel. Farber argued that our system of government is premised on the idea that legislation enacted under the auspices of temporarily assembled coalitions will be enforced. Political
actors order their priorities in reliance on that fact, and to allow legislation that lacks current majoritarian support to expire would be to strip
our governmental system of stability.
Again, this critique does not apply to the revival issue. The
Calabresian and Bickelian models give judges permission to roam
freely through the legal landscape, invalidating a wide range of laws.
Revival arises in a limited number of situations, as the dearth of cases
on point suggests. Thus, while the Calabresian and Bickelian models
by their very breadth threaten the expectations of political actors and
204. Again, it should be made clear that this is a separate inquiry from the political
reliance inquiry. If there is political reliance that meets the criteria set forth above (see
supra text accompanying notes 141-149), prospective overruling is appropriate, even if
the statute at issue does not implicate liberty interests.
One gloss, however, should be added to the rule stated in the text: When the court
has already signalled its willingness to reexamine the invalidating decision-the Baker
case in the typology previously mentioned-and a statute inconsistent with the
invalidating decision is passed, there is no need for prospective overruling of that statute
if the invalidating decision is reversed: ~nformed by the initial invalidating decision, the
legislature has nonetheless decided that it wants the statute, and it has done so at a time
in which the political process is not skewed by reliance on judicial decisions.
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could cause an underinvestment of efforts in political movements, revival does not raise that issue.
Moreover, as our discussion of political reliance shows, while the
Bickelian and Calabresian models undermine the inertial quality of our
governmental system, nonrevival reinforces it. In other words, the
Bickelian and Calabresian models tell political actors that they cannot
allocate resources in reliance on the law as currently reflected in the
body of statutes that the courts have not stricken. Thus, if Bickel's approach had been followed, birth control opponents in Connecticut
would not have been able to rely on the existence of a statute as sufficient protection of their position; they would also have had to allocate
their resources to securing enforcement, even though they were satisfied with the status quo. Under nonrevival, however, political actors
can rely on judicial invalidation of a statute as a bar to future enforcement of that statute and structure their political activities accordingly.
There is no uncertainty, no misallocation of resources.
Nonetheless, it should be recognized that prospective overruling in
cases involving constitutionally problematic statutes is less consistent
with precedent than prospective overruling designed to protect political reliance. Prospective overruling to protect political reliance is similar to well-established techniques that courts use to protect those who
rely on judicial pronouncements. There is, in contrast, only a small
body of opinions that can be used to support the notion that courts
remand constitutionally problematic statutes for reconsideration, 205
and similarly, there is no well-established analogue to a technique that
would allow courts to evaluate constitutionally problematic statutes
under the rule of the invalidating decision, rather than under the rule
of the subsequent overruling decision.
Thus, the strength of the argument for use of the doctrine of prospective overruling in evaluating constitutionally problematic statutes
rests on first principles. Since the criticisms of Bickel and Calabresi do
not provide bases for rejecting nonrevival through prospective overruling, the choice between revival and nonrevival is reduced to a choice
between two different majoritarian approaches. Should courts adopt
the revival position and enforce the decisions of past majorities-decisions uninformed by evolving constitutional doctrine-when those decisions affect individual liberty? Or should they, in accordance with the
nonrevival position, leave the matter to the resolution of current majorities, informed by the relevant judicial decisions? As Bickel's writings
demonstrate, the latter option is the one that is consistent with our constitutional system's commitment to the promotion of liberty.
CoNCLUSION

People rely on the finality of judicial decisions. Over seventy years
205. See cases cited supra note 58.
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ago, Benjamin Cardozo argued that courts should be free to protect
that reliance interest by overruling their prior decisions prospectively
and not applying a new rule of law to transactions that predated its
announcement. 206 In this Article, we have argued that that logic is
equally applicable to the political context. When courts overrule a
prior decision, they should be able to judge statutes passed before the
new decision under the constitutional principles that had been in place
prior to the overruling decision. Prospective overruling with respect to
statutes is at odds with much of the limited body of relevant cases and
commentary, which has been premised on the notion that revival of
statutes that have been "unconstitutional" under previous case law
merely implements the majoritarian will. This premise, however, fails
to take into account the way in which ajudicial determination of unconstitutionality alters the political process. Revival can produce a
counter-majoritarian result and harm those political actors who have
relied on the court's initial judgment.
Use of prospective overruling is also appropriate when there has
been governing case law under which a statute, or one substantially
similar to it, was held to violate an individual liberty right protected by
the Constitution. When that governing case law is overturned, the statute should have to be repassed before it can be enforceable; statutes
that implicate individual liberty interests should be enforced only if the
current majority supports them.
206. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.

